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ABSTRACT
Pursuit-evasion games reside at the intersection of game theory and optimal
control theory. They are often referred to as differential games because the dynamics
of the relative system are modeled by the pursuer and evader differential equations of
motion. Pursuit-evasion games diverge from traditional optimal control problems due
to the participation of multiple intelligent agents with conflicting goals. Individual
goals of each agent are defined through multiple cost functions and determine how
each player will behave throughout the game. The optimal performance of each
player is dependent upon how much knowledge they have about themselves, their
opponent, and the system. Complete information games represent the ideal case in
which each player can truly play optimally because all pertinent information about
the game is readily available to each player.
Player performance in a pursuit-evasion game greatly diminishes as informa-
tion availability moves further from the ideal case and approaches the most real-
istic scenarios. Methods to maintain satisfactory performance in the presence of
incomplete, imperfect, and uncertain information games is very desirable due to
the application of optimal pursuit-evasion solutions to high-risk missions including
spacecraft rendezvous and missile interception. Behavior learning techniques can be
used to estimate the strategy of an opponent and augment the pursuit-evasion game
into a one-sided optimal control problem. The application of behavior learning is
identified in final-time-fixed, infinite-horizon, and final-time-free situations. A two-
step dynamic inversion process is presented to fit systems with nonlinear kinematics
ii
and dynamics into the behavior learning framework for continuous, linear-quadratic
games. These techniques are applied to minimum-time, spacecraft reorientation,
and missile interception examples to illustrate the advantage of these techniques in
real-world applications when essential information is unavailable.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Pursuit-evasion (PE) games reside at the intersection of game theory and op-
timal control theory. More specifically, these scenarios fall within the confines of
differential games (DGs) because the dynamics of the relative system are modeled
by the pursuer and evader differential equations of motion. Differential games di-
verge from traditional optimal control problems (OCPs) due to the participation
of multiple intelligent agents with conflicting goals. Individual goals of each agent
are defined through multiple cost functions - or objective functions, or performance
indices - and determine how each player will behave throughout the game. Addi-
tionally, the dynamic constraint found in traditional OCPs is now being modified by
the control input of multiple players instead of a single agent. The concept of DGs
was widely publicized by Issacs when studying the homicidal chauffeur problem [1].
The optimal performance of each player is dependent upon how much knowledge
they have about themselves, their opponent, and the system. Traditionally, PE
games are investigated through computer-based simulations under the assumption
of a complete information game. In a complete information game, each player has
access to all relevant information pertaining to the game. This information includes
the exact differential equations governing the motion of each agent, the control input
of each agent, and the behavior model each agent has assumed. The behavior of each
player includes their objective and strategy. Player objectives are defined by the form
of their cost function and strategy is determined by the selection of gains found within
1
the cost function. Complete information games represent the ideal case in which each
player can truly play optimally because all information about the game is readily
available. The more realistic cases, however, are subject to incomplete information,
imperfect information, and uncertain information.
Incomplete information games are those in which one or more key pieces of
information about the system is not known precisely. In most incomplete information
games, the behavior of an opponent is unknown. This could mean the evader is not
aware of the pursuer’s strategy or vice versa. Most often, neither player is aware
of their opponent’s strategy. When an opponent’s strategy is unknown, a player
is unable to predict how that opponent will behave and therefore must play more
conservatively by assuming the opponent is attempting to achieve the exact opposite
objective using the same strategy. For example, if the evader’s behavior is unknown
to the pursuer and the pursuer is attempting to minimize a particular cost function
with specific gains, then the pursuer will assume the evader’s behavior is dictated by
maximizing the same cost function with the same gain selections. This conservative
play is referred to as a zero-sum strategy because the pursuer is assuming the evader
is playing the exact opposite game and therefore the sum of both optimal games
is zero. Behavior learning methods for incomplete information games have been
developed but rely on the assumption of a perfect information game [2].
Perfect information games assume the relative states are known exactly and
control history of the opponent is available. This is convenient because it allows batch
estimation methods to be used to determine the strategy of an opponent [2]. In real-
world scenarios, however, relative state measurements are subject to measurement
2
noise and the control history of an opponent is unknown. Therefore, more advanced
methods must be used to help a player play more effectively than the conservative
zero-sum strategy. If the relative state measurements contain errors and the control
history of an opponent is unknown, then the game is referred to as an imperfect
information game.
By introducing modeling errors, it is possible to take the game further into the
realistic realm. Traditionally, simulations assume perfect modeling of the differential
equations which govern the motion of each player. The introduction of modeling
errors produces a disconnect between how each player believes the relative system will
evolve over time and how it actually evolves. This discontinuity has significant effects
on the outcome of a PE game and must be considered in any real-world application.
A game in which modeling errors are present is referred to as an uncertain information
game. Currently, methods designed to overcome the issues associated with imperfect
and uncertain information games are unavailable.
Pursuit-evasion games can take on any level of information availability. The
scope of the work and results presented here will consider all types of information
characteristics. Complete information games will be used as a baseline to aid in the
evaluation of the presented methods. Incomplete information will be used to de-
scribe simulations which experience imperfect and incomplete information because
measurement noise is a common factor in all realistic applications. Uncertain in-
formation will be used to describe simulations which experience the characteristics
of imperfect, incomplete, and uncertain information. These definitions are summa-
rized in Fig. I.1 and have been presented in this manner to allow for unambiguous
3
descriptions of the simulations. Of course, PE games can take on any combination
of the information characteristics found in Fig. I.1. Pursuit-evasion games have a
Figure I.1. Information Characteristics of Pursuit-Evasion Games
wide variety of aerospace applications. Most scenarios involving multiple vehicles
with differing objectives that wish to behave optimally in some way can be cast into
a PE framework. Spacecraft rendezvous missions, where a capture spacecraft is at-
tempting to dock with an uncooperative or retired satellite, can be modeled as a PE
problem. The missile interception problem in which a vehicle is required to intercept
another before a destination is reached also fits into this framework. Aerial tracking
of one or more ground vehicles has the basic characteristics of a PE-type problem
along with other extensions of this work including tasking and spoofing methods.
These examples may involve multiple pursuers or evaders and the concepts can be
applied to any combination of vehicle types including aircraft, spacecraft, and ground
vehicles. Because PE games can be made up of an infinity number of combinations
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of pursuers and evaders, we will limit our discussion and focus on the one-pursuer,
one-evader scenario.
One major obstacle associated with real-world optimal control problems is that
the differential equations governing the dynamic constraints are commonly nonlinear.
This can pose an issue because nonlinear optimal control problems require iterative,
numerical solutions which add additional constraints on time and processing power,
depending on the application. Linear pursuit-evasion games have been studied in
depth and optimal control solutions to those types of problems are well known [3,4].
Moreover, the need for feedback solutions will be stressed. Feedback solutions are
essential to pursuit-evasion because players are not required to play a certain way.
They could take on any strategy at any time and those decisions can be exploited
by feedback control schemes. It would be ideal if nonlinear PE problems could be
transformed into their linear counterparts and the familiar linear techniques could be
applied. This allows the focus to remain on the behavior learning aspects associated
with the incomplete, imperfect, and uncertain information games instead of iterative
solutions. A useful method involves applying dynamic inversion to the system such
that the PE game can be designed with a convenient linear system. Dynamic inver-
sion can be a very useful tool for transforming complex control problems into more
manageable, but still effective systems. This concept has been proven in simulation
and on test flights of advanced weapon systems [5].
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I.A. Motivation
To gain a better understanding of how a player’s performance breaks down with
the varying levels of information availability, we will examine a specific pursuit-
evasion scenario and how the solution changes as information about the players and
system is revoked.
Consider differentially driven vehicles in the horizontal plane where each player
can control the magnitude of their forward velocity, v, and their turn rate, ω. The
no-slip kinematic model of a single player is defined as [6]
x˙ = v cos θ , (1.1)
y˙ = v sin θ , (1.2)
θ˙ = ω , (1.3)
where x and y represent the player position with respect to the inertial reference
frame and θ represents the orientation of the body-fixed reference frame with respect
to the inertial frame. The concept of flat dynamics can be applied to this system to
allow for a linear dynamic representation [7].
For Player i, the desired state representation is given by
zi = [xi, yi, x˙i, y˙i]
T = [zi1 , zi2 , zi3 , zi4 ]
T , (1.4)
z˙i = [zi3 , zi4 , ui1 , ui2 ]
T . (1.5)
Differentiation of Eqns. 1.1 and 1.2 lead to the definition of the true control inputs,
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vi and ωi, in terms of the state vector, z, and new controls, ui1 and ui2 .
vi =
√
z2i3 + z
2
i4
, (1.6)
ωi =
zi3ui2 − zi4ui1
z2i3 + z
2
i4
. (1.7)
Note the denominator found in Eqn. 1.7 is equivalent to v2i and must not be equal to
zero for computation of the true controls. In practice, this is done by having non-zero
initial conditions [8].
By defining ui = [ui1 , ui2 ]
T , Eqn. 1.5 can be written in the vector-matrix form
z˙i = Azi +Bui , (1.8)
where
A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, B =

0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1

. (1.9)
Formulation of the relative state vector is given by
z = zp − ze , (1.10)
where subscripts p and e denote the state vector of the pursuer and evader, respec-
tively. The motivational PE game is then defined by the zero-sum cost function
J =
1
2
zTf Sfzf +
1
2
∫ tf
t0
(
zTQz + uTpRpup − uTe Reue
)
dt , (1.11)
subject to
z˙ = Az +Bup −Bue . (1.12)
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These equations make up a linear-quadratic, final-time-fixed game where sub-
script f dictates the vector or matrix at the final time, tf = 30. First, the results for
the complete information case will be shown as a baseline. Throughout these simu-
lations, the evader will be subject to an imperfect information game and assume a
zero-sum safe strategy in an effort to illustrate how the performance of the pursuer
degrades when its assumption of the evader’s strategy is inaccurate. The true gain
selection for both players is summarized by
Sf =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, Q =

0.009 0 0 0
0 0.009 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

,
and
Rp =
1 0
0 1
 , Re =
1.09 0
0 1.09
 . (1.13)
Figures I.2 - I.4 show the results for the complete information, zero-sum pursuit-
evasion game in which the pursuer and evader implement the same zero-sum cost
function described in Eqn. 1.11. Players start near the origin with non-zero initial
conditions. The aerial view of the players’ trajectories are shown in Fig. I.2. Fig-
ure I.3 contains plots of the relative states along with the total relative displacement
and speed while Fig. I.4 presents the cumulative cost and cost-to-go for each player.
The total cost for the pursuer and the evader are 1.0167 × 102 for this example.
Note that final cost, cumulative cost, and cost-to-go are identical for the pursuer
and evader because of the complete information, zero-sum strategy implementation.
To illustrate the effects of incomplete information, the same simulation was run
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Figure I.2. Final-Time-Fixed, Complete Information Aerial View
Figure I.3. Final-Time-Fixed, Complete Information Relative States
9
Figure I.4. Final-Time-Fixed, Complete Information Cost Analysis
but slightly different gains were assumed by the pursuer while those of the evader
remained constant. The pursuer’s gain selection for the incomplete information case
is summarized by
Sfp =

0.95 0 0 0
0 0.95 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, Qp =

0.01 0 0 0
0 0.01 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, (1.14)
and
Rpp =
1 0
0 1
 , Rep =
1.1 0
0 1.1
 . (1.15)
The results for the incomplete, imperfect information game using the same initial
conditions are shown in Figs. I.5 - I.7. The aerial view of the players’ trajectories
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are shown in Fig. I.5. Figure I.6 contains plots of the relative states along with the
total relative displacement and speed while Fig. I.7 presents the cumulative cost and
cost-to-go for each player. The total cost of the pursuer is 1.9781×103 while that for
the evader is 1.9833×103. The introduction of incomplete information affected both
players as shown by the total cost. This is because the pursuer is now more interested
in the intermediate states yet did not properly assume how much control the evader
was willing to use. Therefore, the evader was able to maximize the performance
index more so than in the complete information game while the pursuer was unable
to minimize the desired performance index as well. Furthermore, the pursuer is
unable to close in on the evader as it was able to in the complete information game.
These results indicate how poor assumptions related to an opponent’s strategy can
decrease the performance of a player.
Finally, the effects of an incomplete, imperfect, uncertain information game are
shown in Figs. I.8 - I.10. In addition to the gain errors in the previous example, the
pursuer was also subject to modeling uncertainties. The relative dynamics are shown
in Eqn. 1.12. Here, modeling uncertainty is defined as errors in the model matrix
A. Therefore, the non-zero elements of the model matrix A assumed by the pursuer
were modified such that
A =

0 0 0.9 0
0 0 0 0.9
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

. (1.16)
The true dynamic model assumed by the evader remained constant throughout all
simulations.
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Figure I.5. Final-Time-Fixed, Incomplete Information Aerial View
Figure I.6. Final-Time-Fixed, Incomplete Information Relative States
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Figure I.7. Final-Time-Fixed, Incomplete Information Cost Analysis
Once the uncertain information is introduced to the game, the pursuer’s per-
formance greatly diminishes and the evader is able to completely evade capture as
illustrated in Figs. I.8 and I.9. The cost analysis for the uncertain information game
is shown in Fig. I.10. Total cost for the pursuer was 8.4537 × 104 while the evader
cost was 8.6271× 104. Again, the total cost for the pursuer increases more than an
order of magnitude once uncertain information is introduced. As desired, the evader
was able to obtain a larger total cost.
A summary of the cumulative cost experienced by the pursuer for all three
final-time-fixed simulations is found in Fig. I.11. It becomes very clear how much
performance can be lost as information pertaining to the game becomes less available.
The goal of the work presented in the following dissertation aims to increase the
performance of a player when faced with an incomplete information game. Behavior
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Figure I.8. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information Aerial View
Figure I.9. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information Relative States
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Figure I.10. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information Cost Analysis
learning techniques will be identified for different types of games defined by their
final-time: final-time-fixed, infinite-horizon, and final-time-free. Once a behavior
learning solution has been implemented and a player can predict their opponent’s
behavior for all time, it is then possible for a player to turn the pursuit-evasion
problem into a one-sided optimal control problem with a time-varying model matrix
A. It will be shown that when a player is subject to incomplete, imperfect, and
uncertain information, these methods can be used to allow the player to gain a
tactical advantage.
Final-time-fixed games are those in which the game occurs for a predetermined
amount of time. Games of these nature are best suited for those where a pursuer
must catch an evader in a fixed amount of time or the evader must not get caught
within a fixed amount of time. In the aerospace realm, final-fixed-time games are
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Figure I.11. Final-Time-Fixed, Cumulative Cost Comparison
best used to define missile interception problems. Often, an interceptor has a small
window in which it must intercept the target of interest before a specific destination
or altitude is reached.
Infinite-horizon games also occur for a predetermined amount of time. That
time, however, is specified as infinity. That is, the pursuit evasion game goes on
indefinitely. Spacecraft proximity operations type problems where one vehicle may
need to get into position to inspect another takes on this form. Another example
includes tracking of a ground vehicle by an aerial vehicle.
Final-time-free games do have have a specified amount of time to be played. In
these games, time is a variable which can be minimized (maximized) by the pursuer
(evader) in an effort to obtain the best performance. In some cases, if the relative
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states or player control inputs are being considered, these games can be reduced to
simply a minimum time problem with a final-state-fixed constraint. Minimum time
problems can also be applied to missile interception in addition to orbit transfer
games for spacecraft rendezvous.
I.B. Literature Review
Differential games were first introduced by Issacs in 1954 [9–12] while at the
RAND Corporation. Over the following decade, DGs received a considerable amount
of interest due to the emergence of a new optimal control topic, but also because
of their obvious applications to warfare strategies including pursuit-evasion and the
popular proportional navigation law for interception [13, 14]. It was not until the
publication of Issacs book in 1964 that the true hurdles of DG theory application
became clear [1]. The largest obstacle involved the very different perspectives that
game theorists and control theorists approached the problem with. Issacs stressed the
need for non-traditional feedback solutions [15] and the true limitations to the theory
when an incomplete information scenario is introduced [1]. Feedback solutions play
a critical role in pursuit-evasion because the decisions made by an opponent must
be taken into account when a player desires a truly optimal solution. The inherent
issue with a feedback scheme is the possible lack of information related to the player,
the opponent, and the relative system.
Initially, zero-sum games in which a single performance index is maximized by
one agent and minimized by another, were studied in depth [16]. Following the
encouragement of Issacs towards a more realistic theory, Starr and Ho introduced
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the nonzero-sum game which takes advantage of the Nash equilibrium solution [17].
Issacs ideas involving information availability were reverberated by Ho in his 1970
survey of DGs where he placed emphasis on information sets and presented a gen-
eralized framework to help mesh the different points of view from game theorists
and control theorists [18]. By 1980, the discrepancies between theory and applica-
tion were apparent as Shinar managed to find a way to reliably apply PE theory to
air-to-air combat scenarios [19].
Work towards a theory with non-ideal state information was initiated by Rhodes
in 1968 when he proposed the use of a separation theorem to deal with measurement
noise in linear-quadratic games. Others built on his idea of stochastic games and laid
a framework for variable information sets which are defined based on ideal, noisy, or
no state measurements [20, 21]. More recently, a push towards multi-player teams
in PE scenarios has been of particular interest with the emergence of unmanned
air vehicles (UAVs) and their military applications. Search and state estimation
strategies for teams of players have been presented by Li and Antoniades, respectively
[22,23].
Still, the little work that been done in the area of incomplete information PE
games has focused on how to handle measurement noise and not on the actual esti-
mation of opponent strategy. The community has focused on imperfect information
games. Most recently, Satak has developed methods for behavior learning in DGs
by separating the estimation issue from the game theory and applying Gaussian-
least-squares-differential-correction (GLSDC) to opponent decision data to estimate
the assumed strategy of an opponent [2, 8]. As we work towards the most realistic
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PE scenarios, strategy estimation techniques are needed which act on relative state
measurements and not the control input of an opponent because that decision data is
most likely unavailable in the true incomplete information case. Additionally, meth-
ods to deal with uncertainties in the dynamic model are also of interest because of
the possible lack of intelligence regarding an opponent, which is prevalent in military
applications.
I.C. Outline
The following pages present the development and implementation of a behav-
ior learning framework for linear and nonlinear PE systems which are subjected to
incomplete, imperfect, and uncertain information scenarios. Behavior learning tech-
niques for final-time-fixed, infinite-horizon, and final-time-free cases will be examined
and compared to baseline results generated from the corresponding complete infor-
mation case. Although these methods can be extended to team-based PE games,
the scope of this work is limited to one-pursuer, one-evader scenarios and the terms
“pursuer” and “Player p” will be used interchangeably along with the terms “evader”
and “Player e”. Throughout the chapters, special focus will be given to the perfor-
mance of the pursuer who will be enabled with behavior learning while the evader
will always assume a zero-sum conservative strategy.
Chapter II presents behavior learning for the final-time-fixed case which is the
most traditional type of pursuit-evasion game found in the literature. The zero-
sum solution to the PE game is derived and the incomplete information behavior
learning method is introduced. An extension to this behavior learning method to
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include the uncertain information case is also derived. It is then shown how a player
can augment their strategy once a behavior learning solution has been obtained,
such that the player enabled with behavior learning can simplify their solution into
that of a one-sided optimal control problem. An extended Kalman filter version
of the final-time-fixed behavior learning technique is developed and implemented
for the motivational example provided in Section I.A. The results for the behavior
learning filter applied to the incomplete and uncertain information cases is compared
to the complete information case and the incomplete and uncertain information cases
without behavior learning.
Behavior learning for infinite-horizon PE is the focus of Ch. III. An infinite-
horizon zero-sum solution is derived and behavior learning methods for incomplete
and uncertain information scenarios are introduced. Strategy augmentation is pro-
vided which a player implements after converging on a behavior learning solution.
The extended Kalman filter is used to implement the infinite-horizon behavior learn-
ing method and apply it to the motivational example found in Section I.A. The
results for the behavior learning filter applied to the incomplete and uncertain infor-
mation cases is compared to the complete information case and the incomplete and
uncertain information cases without behavior learning.
Chapter IV breaks down how behavior learning techniques can be applied to
final-time-free PE games. Specifically, behavior learning for minimum-time PE is
examined with a focus on state space trajectories. A minimum-time pursuit-evasion
example is developed in Ch. V. The feedback solution is derived and behavior
learning is applied to this scenario. A comparison of the assumed and true state
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space trajectories are provided along with the results that arise from implementing
a minimum-time behavior learning filter.
In an effort to allow nonlinear systems to fit within the linear-quadratic behavior
learning framework, a two-step dynamic inversion process is presented in Chapter VI.
Dynamic inversion allows a system with nonlinear kinematics and dynamics to take
on the response specified by the user. Of course, caution must be exercised when
forcing a nonlinear system to behave as a desired linear system.
Two key applications are given in Chapters VII and VIII. Chapter VII contains
a spacecraft attitude reorientation PE scenario which takes on the form of an infinite-
horizon game. The nonlinear model for each spacecraft is developed and dynamic
inversion is applied to test the robustness of behavior learning when key assumptions
made about the model are false. Results for the incomplete information behavior
learning algorithm are compared against complete and incomplete information sce-
narios.
Chapter VIII contains a military application of behavior learning as the missile
interception problem is studied. Following the model derivation, the realistic space
made up of all states defining a single vehicle is transformed to a reduced space and
a proportional-derivative (PD) controller is introduced to allow for proper control
of the missile. The effectiveness of behavior learning is tested with the presence of
dynamic inversion and the control manipulation. Results for complete, incomplete,
and incomplete information with behavior learning are compared.
Finally, Chapter IX contains a summary of the results and conclusions regarding
the development and implementation of behavior learning. Limitations and exten-
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sions to the presented behavior learning framework are given.
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CHAPTER II
FINAL-TIME-FIXED BEHAVIOR LEARNING
In pursuit-evasion games, it is natural for a player to assume a zero-sum safe
strategy if their opponent’s behavior is unknown. As shown in Section I.A, an in-
correct zero-sum strategy assumption can be devastating to a player’s performance,
especially in the presence of imperfect and uncertain information scenarios. Fortu-
nately, behavior learning techniques can be used to estimate the strategy of an op-
ponent. Once an opponent’s strategy is known, it is possible for a player to augment
their performance index as necessary to account for the modeled opponent behavior
which includes modifying the pursuit-evasion game into a one-sided optimal control
problem.
Behavior learning techniques for final-time-fixed pursuit-evasion games were in-
troduced by Satak [2]. These methods are based on the batch estimation technique
GLSDC. The major drawback of these techniques are the assumption of a perfect
information game in which the control input of the opponent is readily available for
processing. As the discussion of pursuit-evasion moves further from the ideal scenario
and approaches most realistic cases, it becomes apparent that the control input of an
opponent will be unavailable in the most realistic pursuit-evasion games. In an effort
to allow implementation of behavior learning in the most realistic pursuit-evasion
scenarios, it is critical for the methods to be applicable to incomplete, imperfect,
and uncertain information games.
This chapter identifies the form of behavior learning needed for final-time-fixed
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pursuit-evasion games with varying levels of information availability. Once the form
of behavior learning is identified, it is possible to utilize any one of several estimation
techniques to estimate the parameters which capture the behavior of a given oppo-
nent. The methods presented here assume an incomplete and imperfect information
scenario where the only measurements available to the player are the relative states
associated with the pursuit-evasion model. Relative state measurements are subject
to a zero-mean Gaussian noise distribution. It will also be shown that under cer-
tain conditions, these behavior learning methods can be extended to the incomplete,
imperfect, and uncertain information scenarios.
The methods outlined in this chapter will follow many of the same game as-
sumptions previously discussed. For consistency, we will always consider the pursuer
to be enabled with behavior learning. The evader will continue to play using the
same type of behavior used in the previous examples. Specifically, the evader will be
subject to an incomplete information game and will assume a zero-sum safe strategy
for the duration of the game. The evader will not be using any type of behavior
learning and will always be subject to an imperfect and certain information game.
That is, the evader’s relative state measurements will be subject to a zero-mean
Gaussian noise distribution and the evader’s relative dynamic model will contain no
inaccuracies. Of course, it is possible for either or both players to be enabled with
behavior learning and be subject to varying levels of information availability. The
assumptions made here are done in an effort to limit the scope of the discussion to
study how well the developed techniques perform for a single intelligent player with
behavior learning enabled against an opponent that assumes a safe strategy with
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reliable modeling information possibly gathered from a reconnaissance mission.
When considering the perspective of the pursuer, we wish to enable the pursuer
with a means to improve its total cost for the PE game. When faced with an incom-
plete information game, it will not be possible to achieve the same performance of an
complete information game even with behavior learning enabled because the com-
plete information game represents the ideal case. However, if the overall performance
of the pursuer can be improved by a quantifiable means for a game with incomplete
information, then the behavior learning method has been successful. Behavior learn-
ing aims to estimate the the strategy of the PE opponent using an assumed objective
function. The strategy is defined as the gain selection the opponent uses to compute
its control.
Pursuit-evasion games can be defined by an infinite number of cost function
and dynamic system combinations. The focus of this discussion will be limited to
continuous-time, linear-quadratic, PE games. These types of games are defined by
quadratic cost functions subject to a continuous, linear, dynamic constraint. Optimal
solutions to zero-sum games will be reviewed before identifying where player strategy
manifests within the solution. It is possible to add additional constraints to these
PE games. Final-state constraints can be used to require interception or rendezvous.
Control constraints can also be implemented. Unfortunately, these additional con-
straints tend to rely on iterative solution methods such as multiple shooting which
do not use feedback. As mentioned in Chapter I, feedback solutions are absolutely
critical for pursuit-evasion applications and their importance will continue to play a
primary role in this framework.
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II.A. Pursuit-Evasion
In a traditional two-player PE scenario involving no external objectives, the
pursuer is interested in driving some or all of the relative states between the two
players, z, to zero while conserving enough control input, up, to do so. For an
intercept problem, the pursuer is most concerned about the relative position. The
relative velocity at intercept is not of interest because an intercept generally means
destruction of both vehicles. In a rendezvous problem, the pursuer may want to drive
the relative position and velocity to zero so neither vehicle is damaged if rendezvous
occurs.
Simultaneously, the evader is attempting to maximize some or all of the relative
states in an effort to prevent capture. The evader must also be cautious about
the amount of control, ue, being spent. These characteristics allows the game to
be formulated as an optimal control problem with the dynamic constraint being
modified by two intelligent agents.
Zero-sum pursuit-evasion games are those in which a single cost function is used
to define the entire game. The pursuer attempts to minimize the zero-sum cost
function while the evader works to maximize it. These types of games have also
been referred to as minimax games [24]. A zero-sum, final-time-fixed, LQ PE game
is traditionally defined by a performance index of the form
JZSfix = φ (zf , tf ) +
∫ tf
t0
L (z,up,ue, t) dt , (2.1)
JZSfix =
1
2
zTf Sfzf +
1
2
∫ tf
t0
(
zTQz + uTpRpup − uTe Reue
)
dt , (2.2)
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subject to the linear dynamic constraint
z˙ = f (z,up,ue) = Az +Bup −Bue , (2.3)
where z ∈ Rn and up,ue ∈ Rm. Matrices Sf , Q, Rp, and Re represent the gains for
the zero-sum game and subscript f is used to denote the state or gain at the final
time tf . Matrices Sf and Q are symmetric and positive semidefinite, while Rp and
Re are symmetric and positive definite. Here, the relative plant in Eqn. 2.3 and the
weight matrices are assumed to be time-invariant.
As discussed in Ch. I and stressed by Issacs [15], we seek a closed-loop control
solution. The Hamiltonian is defined by
H = L+ λTf , (2.4)
H =
1
2
(
zTQz + uTpRpup − uTe Reue
)
+ λT (Az +Bup −Bue) . (2.5)
Control solutions are given by the stationarity conditions
∂H
∂up
= 0 → up = −R−1p BTλ , (2.6)
∂H
∂ue
= 0 → ue = −R−1e BTλ . (2.7)
When Eqns. 2.6 and 2.7 are substituted into the state equation given by Eqn. 2.3,
this yields
z˙ = Az −BR−1p BTλ+BR−1e BTλ . (2.8)
The costate equation is given by
∂H
∂z
= −λ˙T → λ˙ = −Qz − ATλ , (2.9)
and optimal control theory [4], the terminal condition is given by
λ(tf ) =
∂φ
∂z tf
= Sfzf . (2.10)
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The initial condition is given by initial states z0 and the two-point boundary-
value problem can be solved using the sweep method [3]. Assuming the state and
costate satisfy a linear relation that takes on the form of Eqn. 2.10 for all time
t ∈ [t0, tf ], then
λ = Sz . (2.11)
If such an S can be found, then the assumption given in Eqn. 2.11 is valid.
The solution requires differentiating the costate.
λ˙ = S˙z + Sz˙ . (2.12)
By substituting Eqns. 2.9 and 2.8 into Eqn. 2.12 and rearranging, the differential
equation for S becomes
S˙ = −Q− ATS − SA+ SBR−1p BTS − SBR−1e BTS . (2.13)
Equation 2.13 takes on the form of a modified matrix Riccati equation used for PE.
An effective gain R can be computed based on Rp and Re to transform it into a
standard matrix Riccati equation. If
R−1 = R−1p −R−1e , (2.14)
then
S˙ = −Q− ATS − SA+ SBR−1BTS . (2.15)
Using the backwards sweep method, S can now be solved for at every time t by
starting at time tf and integrating backwards through time using Sf as the terminal
condition. The feedback control solutions become
up = −Kpz , (2.16)
ue = −Kez , (2.17)
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with the time-varying Kalman gains Kp and Ke defined as
Kp = R
−1
p B
TS , (2.18)
Ke = R
−1
e B
TS . (2.19)
The single cost function found in Eqn. 2.2 is used for a complete information
game. In an incomplete information game, a zero-sum safe strategy could be im-
plemented by either player if they are not confident in their assumed opponent’s
objective and strategy. Each player would assume their own cost function of the
form shown in Eqn. 2.2 which is done in an attempt to implement a conservative
strategy. This strategy assumes an opponent is attempting to accomplish the exact
opposite objective.
II.B. Incomplete Information Behavior Learning
Because behavior is made up of an objective and strategy, it is necessary to
assume a form for the opponent’s (or in this case, the evader’s) objective function in
order to estimate any type of strategy. If the evader is not enabled with behaving
learning as well, it is reasonable to assume that the evader is implementing a zero-
sum safe strategy whose solution is given by Eqn. 2.17. Before implementing a
behavior learning technique, it is necessary to identify where the strategy manifests
itself within the evader’s optimal control solution.
The optimal control for the evader is dictated by the relative states, z, and
the Kalman gain which is given by Eqn. 2.19. From the solution derivation shown
in Section II.A, it is clear that Ke = Ke(B, S,Re), and because the differential
equation S˙ = S˙(A,B, S,Q,Rp, Re) from Eqn. 2.13, it can be concluded that Ke =
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Ke(A,B, S,Q,Rp, Re). In a certain information game, system matrices A and B are
known exactly and the behavior learning objectives evolves into the estimation of
Ke = Ke(S,Q,Rp, Re). Because the gains are relative and the optimal solution is
indifferent to scaled gain selections, it is possible to consider the evader’s selection
of gains Q, Re, and S relative to Rp = 1, where 1 is an identity matrix of the
appropriate size. It follows that for an incomplete and imperfect information game
where the evader assumes a zero-sum safe strategy, the entire strategy assumed by
the evader is captured in the Kalman gain Ke and the objective of behavior learning
has evolved into estimating Ke = Ke(S,Q,Re).
One issue that must still be addressed involves the fact that for the final-time-
fixed case, the Kalman gain Ke is time-varying because of the influence of Eqn. 2.13.
Depending on the nature of the game, reasonable assumptions can be made about
the form of the gains Sf , Q, and Re. For example, it is already known that these
gain matrices are symmetric, which decreases the number of independent elements
to be estimated. Additionally, these gain matrices are most often diagonal to reduce
unwanted cross-coupling effects. If system matrices A and B are known perfectly,
then their sparceness can also help determine which elements of the optimal gains
influence Ke.
The final hurdle is the relationship between the estimated S and the chosen Sf
of the evader. It should be noted what the pursuer must do after solving the behavior
learning problem. It will be shown that if Ke can be computed for each instance
in time, then the pursuer can augment their cost function such that the two-sided
pursuit-evasion problem becomes a one-sided optimal control problem. The gain Sf
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simply provides the terminal condition for the two-point boundary value problem
and allows for calculation of S before the game starts. If the gains S, Q, and Re can
be estimated with Rp = 1, then S can be computed at each instance in time using
Eqn. 2.13. The chosen Sf simply allows for the calculation of S by specifying S at
tf . Therefore, if S can be determined through another means at a given t, then its
solution at each instance in time can be determined.
Recall from Eqn. 2.36 that after behavior learning occurs, the one-sided OCP
that the pursuer switches to requires the computation of the gain Ke in a backwards
sweep fashion. Thus, S must be known at every instance in time prior to implement-
ing the modified Kp based on the one-sided OCP. This can be accomplished by using
the estimated evader Q and Re and propagating S forward in time. This means that
the evader’s entire strategy can be defined by the estimated values Q, Re, and S
along with Eqn. 2.15 when it is assumed that Rp = 1.
Sequential estimation techniques require differential state equations for the states
being estimated. In an imperfect information game, the relative states of interest
defined by z are measured through some means whether directly or by measuring
the inertial movements of both players then computing the necessary relative states.
Therefore, it is assumed the relative states are subject to a zero-mean Gaussian
distribution and the estimation of z is also of interest.
It has been shown here that the entire strategy assumed by the evader is cap-
tured in the time-varying Kalman gain Ke. To implement the most efficient behavior
learning techniques, it is essential to apply all knowledge about the system. There-
fore, the details of Ke must be investigated. Consider the example with differentially
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driven vehicles in the horizontal plane presented in Section I.A. The relative system
is given by Eqn. 1.12.
If the evader is interested in the relative position only, weighs the x- and y-
components equally, and also weighs the control inputs for x and y equally, then the
gains will take on the form
Sf =

sf 0 0 0
0 sf 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, Q =

q 0 0 0
0 q 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, Rp =
1 0
0 1
 , Re =
r 0
0 r
 .
(2.20)
With these selections and the help of Eqn. 2.13, the instantaneous S takes on the
form
S =

s1 0 s3 0
0 s1 0 s3
s3 0 s2 0
0 s3 0 s2

. (2.21)
We now see for this particular problem, Ke as a function of S and Re becomes
Ke =
 s3r 0 s2r 0
0 s3
r
0 s2
r
 . (2.22)
The way in which player strategy manifests within the control computation for
the final-time-fixed scenario has been identified. Next, the state equations for the
parameters must be identified to implement any of several estimation tools to carry
out the parameter estimation. The objective is to estimate the relative states, z,
and the independent elements of S, Q, and Re the evader has assumed using the
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measured relative states and the known control input of the pursuer, up.
The states to estimate are given by the vector
x = [z1, z2, z3, z4, s1, s2, s3, q, r]
T , (2.23)
x = [x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9]
T , (2.24)
where states x1 − x7 are time-varying. Because these states are time-varying, it is
necessary to implement a sequential estimator to identify these states. The state
equations for x1 − x4 are given by Eqn. 2.3 and the state equations for x5 − x7 are
given by the corresponding scalar elements of Eqn. 2.13.
At first glance, Eqn. 2.3 appears to be linear. However, after substitution of
Eqns. 2.17 and 2.19, it becomes nonlinear in the states.
z˙ = Az +Bup +BR
−1
e B
TSz . (2.25)
Therefore, a nonlinear estimator is required. The states x8 and x9 are constant so
the corresponding state equations are simply zero.
For this particular example, with up = [up1 , up2 ], the corresponding state equa-
tions are summarized as
x˙(t) = f (x(t),u(t), t) , (2.26)
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where
f =

x3
x4
x1x7
x9
+ x3x6
x9
+ up1
x2x7
x9
+ x4x6
x9
+ up2
x27 − x
2
7
x9
− x8
x26 − x
2
6
x9
− 2x7
x6x7 − x5 − x6x7x9
0
0

. (2.27)
The measurements available for the behavior learning filter are
y˜k = h (xk) = [x1 , x2 , x3 , x4]
T . (2.28)
Equations 2.26 and 2.28 are in the standard form needed for a nonlinear filter
such as the extended Kalman or unscented filters. Once a nonlinear estimator is
employed and has converged on a solution for the estimates given by Eqn. 2.24, the
pursuer can then compute the evader’s Kalman gain at each instance in time using
Eqns. 2.22 and 2.13. As the complexity of the relative dynamic system increases,
so does the chance for observability issues to occur. Nonlinear observability can be
computed using the Lie derivative [25]. If a linearized filter is implemented such as an
extended Kalman filter, observability can be computed by checking the rank of the
observability matrix O [25]. For this particular example, the system is observable.
Observability must be treated on a case-by-case basis because each system model
and associated strategy assumptions are different.
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II.C. Uncertain Information Behavior Learning
The behavior learning framework presented in the previous section may be ex-
tended to the uncertain information case. In an uncertain information game, a player
is subject to modeling errors present in the relative dynamic model. In Section I.A,
this was defined to be errors in the model matrix A. The independent elements of
A can be added to the state estimate vector described by Eqn. 2.27.
For the ongoing example, the true model matrix is given by
A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

. (2.29)
It is important that all available information about the system is applied. For this
specific example, it will be assumed that A contains two independent elements defined
by
A =

0 0 a1 0
0 0 0 a2
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

. (2.30)
For the time-invariant case, the state equations describing these new parame-
ters are simply a˙1 = a˙2 = 0. The behavior learning state estimate vector is then
augmented such that
x = [z1, z2, z3, z4, s1, s2, s3, q, r, a1, a2]
T , (2.31)
x = [x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11]
T , (2.32)
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and the state equation vector becomes
f =

x3x10
x4x11
x1x7
x9
+ x3x6
x9
+ up1
x2x7
x9
+ x4x6
x9
+ up2
x27 − x
2
7
x9
− x8
x26 − x
2
6
x9
− 2x7x10
x6x7 − x5x10 − x6x7x9
0
0
0
0

. (2.33)
No additional measurements are available, therefore the form of Eqn. 2.28 re-
mains the same. It is obvious that as model parameters are added to the state
estimate vector, the possibly for the system to be unobservable become greater. For
this particular example, the observability matrix O is of full rank. This form of the
behavior learning algorithm will be implemented by the pursuer for the uncertain
information case.
II.D. Augmented Strategy
If an agent is enabled with behavior learning, it is possible for that agent to
turn the pursuit-evasion game into a one-sided optimal control problem. The goal
of behavior learning is to give an agent a tactical advantage in an incomplete infor-
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mation game. The objective is to estimate the opponent’s strategy then use that
information to play more effectively than simply assuming a zero-sum strategy. By
taking on the pursuer’s perspective, it becomes apparent that the pursuer is inter-
ested in estimating the evader’s Kalman gain, Ke. Equation 2.19 reveals that for the
final-time-fixed case, Ke is time-varying because of the influence of the solution of S.
If the pursuer can properly estimate Ke such that it can be computed for any time
t, then the new one-sided optimal control problem for the pursuer becomes
JPfix = min
1
2
zTf Sfzf +
1
2
∫ tf
t0
(
zTQz + uTpRpup
)
dt , (2.34)
subject to the modified system
z˙ = (A+BKe) z +Bup . (2.35)
Following the same solution derivation process for the zero-sum strategy, the
Hamiltonian is formed and the stationarity condition coupled with the costate equa-
tion solution yields the same feedback control law given by Eqns. 2.16 and 2.18.
Here, S is found using
S˙ = −Q− (A+BKe)T S − S (A+BKe) + SBR−1p BTS . (2.36)
Note the S, Q, and Rp here are the pursuer’s assumed gains and different from
those which are estimated and those which are assumed by the evader. The estimated
gains are used in the computation of Ke.
II.E. Extended Kalman Filter Implementation
One of the most pivotal contributions to optimal estimation came from Kalman
in 1960 with the introduction of the Kalman filter for estimation of linear systems [26].
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Because aerospace systems are most commonly nonlinear, extensions to his work were
soon introduced [27, 28]. The nonlinear extension of the Kalman filter came to be
known as the extended Kalman filter (EKF) and has been the de facto estimation
technique for nonlinear systems, especially for navigation applications. Because of
the nonlinearities in the the behavior learning problem shown in Eqn. 2.15, the EKF
lends itself nicely to behavior learning applications.
By blindly applying an extended Kalman filter to the imperfect information
motivational example problem in an attempt to estimate the relative states and gain
matrices Q, Re, and S, one would find themselves with 40 states to estimate. This
is taking Rp as identity and scaling all gains with respect to Rp. By applying system
knowledge and choosing the independent elements of these matrices to estimate, it
is possible to reduce the number of state estimates to 9. Observability can become
an issue if the system becomes too complex, the number of independent elements
cannot be reduced, or if relative state measurements are unavailable. Observability
should be treated on a case-by-case basis and can be computed for nonlinear systems
using the Lie derivative [25]. However, due to the structure of the extended Kalman
filter and how it is linearized using a first-order Taylor series expansion about the
estimated state, linear observability methods can be applied as well.
A continuous-discrete extended Kalman filter takes on the form [29]
x˙(t) = f(x(t),u(t), t) +G(t)w(t), w(t) ∼ N(0, Q(t)) , (2.37)
y˜k = h(xk) + vk, vk ∼ N(0, Rk) , (2.38)
where the states to be estimated are designated by the vector x and the discrete
measurements are designated by the vector y˜k. The model process noise is denoted
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by w(t) and G(t) is the process noise distribution matrix. Measurement noise at
each time-step is given by vk. Matrices Q(t) and Rk make up the covariance for
noise processes w(t) and vk, respectively. Note the vector function f(x(t),u(t), t) is
fundamentally different from those used in the dynamic inversion process.
For the dynamic model, recall the relative system of the motivational example
given by Eqn. 1.12 and consider the pursuer attempting to learn evader’s behavior.
z˙ = Az +Bup −Bue , (2.39)
where
z = [xr, yr, x˙r, y˙r]
T , up = [up1 , up2 ]
T , ue = [ue1 , ue2 ]
T , (2.40)
and
A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, B =

0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1

. (2.41)
The states xr, yr, x˙r, and y˙r represent the relative position and velocity of the
two players in the horizontal plane while ui denotes the control input vector for
player i. It is also assumed that all elements of z can be measured at each instance
in time.
When considering the perspective of the pursuer, it is known what the computed
up is for each instance in time. However, the evader’s control input ue is unknown.
It is necessary to assume a form for the evader’s control. Here, it is assumed the
evader is using a zero-sum safe strategy without behavior learning. For a zero-sum
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strategy game, the evader’s control input takes on the form
ue = −R−1e BTSez , (2.42)
where
S˙e = −Qe − ATSe − SeA+ SeBR−1p BTSe + SeBR−1e BTSe . (2.43)
Matrices Se and Qe are of size 4× 4 while Re and Rp are of size 2× 2. Matrices Se
and Qe are symmetric positive semidefinite while Re is symmetric positive definite.
Furthermore, it is a reasonable assumption that Qe and Re are diagonal. Using these
characteristics with the known form of A and B, it is possible to estimate the unique,
non-zero elements in Qe, Re, and Se. Gain Rp is assumed to be identity. That is,
the elements of Qe, Re, and Se are normalized with respect to Rp.
Relating back to the EKF dynamic model, the state estimate x is now an 9× 1
vector made up of the following elements:
z =

x1
x2
x3
x4

, Se =

x5 0 x7 0
0 x5 0 x7
x7 0 x6 0
0 x7 0 x6

, Qe =

x8 0 0 0
0 x8 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, Re =
x9 0
0 x9
 .
(2.44)
By substituting Eqn. 2.42 into Eqn. 2.39, the state equations for x1 through x4
are given by
f1:4 = z˙ = Az +Bup −BR−1e BTSez , (2.45)
while the state equations for x5 through x7 are given by the corresponding scalar
equations found in Eqn. 2.43. Because the matrices Qe and Re are constant, the
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state equations for their elements are simply f8:9 = 0. This behavior learning form
of the EKF is representative of a incomplete and imperfect information game.
The pursuer is equipped with the necessary sensors such that z can be measured.
Mathematically, h = z. In practice, this could be done by measuring the relative
states directly or by computing the pursuer’s inertial states using strapdown inertial
navigation then tracking the evader using a ground station with a communication
link to the pursuer.
II.E.1. Incomplete Information Results
The incomplete information example shown in Section I.A was simulated again
but this time with an EKF version of the behavior learning algorithm running. At t =
5, a new optimal control solution was computed by the pursuer using the augmented
strategy defined in Section II.D. Figures II.1 - II.6 convey the results for the behavior
learning case. By computing a new solution based the the behavior learning results,
the pursuer was able to reduce its total cost to 1.0414× 102 while the evader’s cost
was computed to be 1.0348 × 102. The pursuer’s behavior learning algorithm was
able to converge on estimates for the independent elements found in gain matrices
Q, Re, and S assumed by the evader as shown in Figs. II.4 and II.5. A comparison of
the cost and cost-to-go for the complete, incomplete, and incomplete with behavior
learning cases in Fig. II.6.
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Figure II.1. Final-Time-Fixed, Incomplete Information with Behavior
Learning Aerial View
Figure II.2. Final-Time-Fixed, Incomplete Information with Behavior
Learning Relative States
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Figure II.3. Final-Time-Fixed, Incomplete Information with Behavior
Learning Cost Analysis
II.E.2. Uncertain Information Behavior Learning Results
The incomplete information example shown in Section I.A was simulated again
but this time with an EKF version of the behavior learning algorithm running. At
t = 5, a new optimal control solution was computed by the pursuer using the aug-
mented strategy defined in Section II.D. Figures II.7 - II.13 convey the results for
the behavior learning case. By computing a new solution based the the behavior
learning results, the pursuer was able to reduce its total cost to 1.6519 × 102 while
the evader’s cost was computed to be 1.6567× 102. The pursuer’s behavior learning
algorithm was able to converge on estimates for the independent elements found in
gain matrices Q, Re, and S assumed by the evader as shown in Figs. II.10 and II.11.
Moreover, the estimates of the independent elements found within model matrix A
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Figure II.4. Final-Time-Fixed, Incomplete Information with Behavior
Learning S Estimates
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Figure II.5. Final-Time-Fixed, Incomplete Information with Behavior
Learning Q and R Estimates
Figure II.6. Final-Time-Fixed, Incomplete Information Cumulative Cost
Comparison
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properly converged as evident from Fig. II.12. A comparison of the cost and cost-to-
go for the complete information, incomplete information, and incomplete information
with behavior learning cases in Fig. II.13.
Figure II.7. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning Aerial View
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Figure II.8. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning Relative States
Figure II.9. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning Cost Analysis
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Figure II.10. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning S Estimates
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Figure II.11. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning Q and R Estimates
Figure II.12. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning A Estimates
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Figure II.13. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information Cumulative Cost
Comparison
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II.F. Summary
By identifying how player strategy manifests itself within the Kalman gain, it
becomes possible to implement a behavior learning filter to estimate opponent strat-
egy from an assumed behavior model and relative state measurements. Seemingly
linear-quadratic games may require nonlinear estimation techniques due to the non-
linearities present in the Riccati equation and relative equations of motion once the
form of the opponent’s control input is substituted.
A cumulative cost comparison for all five cases of the final-time-fixed pursuit-
evasion game is summarized in Fig. II.14. In both the incomplete and uncertain
information cases, behavior learning was able to increase the pursuer’s performance
when a new solution was computed at t = 5. The pursuer’s final cost summary is
shown in Table II.1.
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Figure II.14. Final-Time-Fixed, Cumulative Cost Comparison Summary
Table II.1. Planar Game Final-Time-Fixed Cost Summary
Information Type Pursuer Cost
Complete 1.0167× 102
Incomplete 1.9781× 103
Uncertain 8.4537× 104
Incomplete + BL 1.0414× 102
Uncertain + BL 1.6567× 102
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CHAPTER III
INFINITE-HORIZON BEHAVIOR LEARNING
This chapter identifies the form of behavior learning needed for infinite-horizon
pursuit-evasion games with varying levels of information availability. It is possible
to implement any one of several estimation methods to estimate the parameters
which capture the behavior of a given opponent once the form of behavior learning
is identified. Many of the same assumptions made for the final-time-fixed case will
also be exploited for infinite-horizon behavior learning. The methods presented here
assume an incomplete and imperfect information scenario where the only measure-
ments available to the player are the relative states which are subject to a zero-mean
Gaussian noise distribution. Behavior learning for the incomplete information case
will also be extended to encompass the uncertain information case.
Similar to the previous chapter, we will always consider the pursuer to be enabled
with behavior learning. The evader will continue to be subject to an incomplete
information game and will assume a zero-sum safe strategy for the duration of the
game. The evader will not be using any type of behavior learning and will always be
subject to an imperfect and certain information game.
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III.A. Pursuit-Evasion
A zero-sum infinite-horizon LQ PE game is traditionally defined by a perfor-
mance index of the form
JZSinf =
∫ ∞
t0
L (z,up,ue) dt , (3.1)
JZSinf =
1
2
∫ ∞
t0
(
zTQz + uTpRpup − uTe Reue
)
dt , (3.2)
subject to the same dynamic constraint shown in Eqn. 2.3. Matrices Q, Rp, and Re
take on the same symmetry and definiteness assumptions found in the final-fixed-time
case. The Hamiltonian for the infinite-horizon case takes on the same form defined
by Eqn. 2.4 and subsequently, the stationarity conditions and costate equations yield
the same results shown in Eqns. 2.6, 2.7, and 2.9.
As the final-time approaches infinity, the Riccati equation in Eqn. 2.15 can
converge to a limiting solution S(∞). If S(∞) exists, then the optimal feedback
control laws for the infinite-horizon case take on the form [4]
up = −Kpz , (3.3)
ue = −Kez , (3.4)
with the Kalman gains Kp and Ke defined as
Kp = R
−1
p B
TS (∞) , (3.5)
Ke = R
−1
e B
TS (∞) . (3.6)
The solution to S(∞) is given by the modified algebraic Riccati equation (ARE)
0 = Q+ ATS + SA− SBR−1p BTS + SBR−1e BTS , (3.7)
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which can be simplified to the standard ARE
0 = Q+ ATS + SA− SBR−1BTS , (3.8)
using the effective control weight matrix relation
R−1 = R−1p −R−1e . (3.9)
Equation 3.8 can be solved for S using the Schur method [30]. Note that if z, up, and
ue are scalar, then the solution to Eqn. 3.8 simply reduces to the quadratic equation.
III.A.1. Infinite-Horizon Example
A complete information example is provided along with incomplete and uncer-
tain information examples to show how the performance of the pursuer degrades
as information is revoked from the infinite-horizon pursuit-evasion game. The pla-
nar system described in Section I.A is used, only a new performance index of the
form shown in Eqn. 3.2 is implemented. The complete information gain selection is
summarized by
Q =

10 0 0 0
0 10 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, Rp =
1 0
0 1
 , Re =
1.09 0
0 1.09
 , (3.10)
Figures III.1 - III.3 show the results for the complete information, zero-sum
pursuit-evasion game in which the pursuer and evader implement the same zero-sum
cost function described in Eqn. 3.2. Players start near the origin with the same non-
zero initial conditions as those used for the final-fixed-time cases. The aerial view
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of the players’ trajectories are shown in Fig. III.1. Figure III.2 contains plots of the
relative states along with the total relative displacement and speed while Fig. III.3
presents the cumulative cost and cost-to-go for each player. The total cost for the
pursuer and the evader are 3.4449 × 106 for this example. Note that final cost,
cumulative cost, and cost-to-go are identical for the pursuer and evader because of
the complete information, zero-sum strategy implementation.
Figure III.1. Infinite-Horizon, Complete Information Aerial View
To illustrate the effects of incomplete information, the same simulation was run
but slightly different gains were assumed by the pursuer while those of the evader
remained constant. The pursuer’s gain selection for the incomplete information case
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Figure III.2. Infinite-Horizon, Complete Information Relative States
Figure III.3. Infinite-Horizon, Complete Information Cost Analysis
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is summarized by
Qp =

9.5 0 0 0
0 9.5 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, Rpp =
1 0
0 1
 , Rep =
1.1 0
0 1.1
 . (3.11)
The results for the incomplete, imperfect information game using the same initial
conditions are shown in Figs. III.4 - III.6. The aerial view of the players’ trajectories
are shown in Fig. III.4. Figure III.5 contains plots of the relative states along with the
total relative displacement and speed while Fig. III.6 presents the cumulative cost and
cost-to-go for each player. The total cost of the pursuer is 7.5409×1046 while that for
the evader is 7.5037×1046. The introduction of incomplete information affected both
players as shown by the total cost and turns out to be completely devastating to the
pursuer’s performance. These results indicate how poor assumptions related to an
opponent’s strategy can decrease the performance of a player in the infinite-horizon
case.
Finally, the effects of an incomplete, imperfect, uncertain information game are
shown in Figs. III.7 - III.9. In addition to the gain errors in the previous example,
the pursuer was also subject to modeling uncertainties. Here, modeling uncertainty
is defined as errors in the model matrix A. Therefore, the non-zero elements of the
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Figure III.4. Infinite-Horizon, Incomplete Information Aerial View
Figure III.5. Infinite-Horizon, Incomplete Information Relative States
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Figure III.6. Infinite-Horizon, Incomplete Information Cost Analysis
model matrix A assumed by the pursuer were modified such that
A =

0 0 0.9 0
0 0 0 0.9
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

. (3.12)
The true dynamic model assumed by the evader remained constant throughout all
simulations.
Once the uncertain information is introduced to the game, the pursuer’s per-
formance diminishes even further as illustrated in Figs. III.7 and III.8. The cost
analysis for the uncertain information game is shown in Fig. III.9. Total cost for the
pursuer was 3.8193× 1060 while the evader cost was 3.7995× 1060.
Figure III.10 illustrates how the pursuer’s performance degrades as information
is revoked from the infinite-horizon pursuit-evasion game.
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Figure III.7. Infinite-Horizon, Uncertain Information Aerial View
Figure III.8. Infinite-Horizon, Uncertain Information Relative States
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Figure III.9. Infinite-Horizon, Uncertain Information Cost Analysis
Figure III.10. Infinite-Horizon, Cumulative Cost Comparison
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III.B. Incomplete Information Behavior Learning
From Eqn. 3.6 it is immediately apparent that the evader’s Kalman gain is
dependent on B, S, and Re. Because S is the solution to the ARE found in Eqn. 3.7,
the Kalman gain is once again Ke = Ke(A,B, S,Q,Rp, Re). Taking A and B to
be known and scaling the gains with respect to Rp = 1, we can define Ke as a
function of the unknowns Ke = Ke(S,Q,Re). It is important to apply all pertinent
knowledge about the game to simplify the behavior learning task. Considering the
same example problem of differentially driven vehicles in the horizontal plane, as
described in Sect. II.A, the same form of the gain assumptions will be applied here.
With the assumed form of Q and Re shown in Eqn. 2.20, solution of the the
ARE in Eqn. 3.7 produces an S of the form
S =

s1 0 s3 0
0 s1 0 s3
s3 0 s2 0
0 s3 0 s2

. (3.13)
Substituting the form of S and Re into Eqn. 3.6, the 2× 4 Kalman gain used by the
evader is
Ke =
 s3r 0 s2r 0
0 s3
r
0 s2
r
 . (3.14)
Recall that the form of S from the solution to the ARE is constant. This is
important because it follows that with a constant Re, the evader’s Kalman gain is
also a constant. The form for Ke for the differentially driven vehicles in the plane
is encouraging because we have revealed for this particular example, the evader’s
63
Kalman gain is made up of only two independent and constant elements. Therefore,
we can conclude that the entire strategy for the evader taking part in an infinite-
horizon pursuit-evasion game can be captured by the parameters k1 and k2 where
Ke =
k1 0 k2 0
0 k1 0 k2
 . (3.15)
Note that the form of Ke in Eqn. 3.15 is not always the case. However, it should
always be possible to reduce the number of independent elements found in Ke by
applying knowledge to the system. For the case with four relative states and two
control inputs, Ke will have at most eight unique elements and will always be constant
for the infinite-horizon scenario.
For infinite-horizon behavior learning, the states to estimate are now defined by
the vector
x = [z1, z2, z3, z4, k1, k2] , (3.16)
x = [x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6] , (3.17)
where states x1 − x4 are time-varying and whose state equations are given by
z˙ = Az +Bup +BKez (3.18)
The state equations needed for the nonlinear estimator are summarized by
x˙(t) = f (x(t),u(t), t) , (3.19)
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where
f =

x3
x4
x1x5 + x3x6 + up1
x5x7 + x4x6 + up2
0
0

, (3.20)
and up = [up1 , up2 ].
The measurements available are the relative states defined by
y˜k = h (xk) = [x1 , x2 , x3 , x4]
T . (3.21)
Equations 3.19 and 3.21 are in the standard form needed for a nonlinear filter.
Once a nonlinear estimator is employed and has converged on a solution for the
estimates given by Eqn. 3.17, the pursuer can then compute the evader’s Kalman
gain at each instance in time because it is fixed. The gain can be continuously
monitored and the pursuer has the ability to modify the solution as necessary.
III.C. Uncertain Information Behavior Learning
The behavior learning framework presented in the previous section may be ex-
tended to the uncertain information case. In an uncertain information game, a player
is subject to modeling errors present in the relative dynamic model. In Section I.A,
this was defined to be errors in the model matrix A. The independent elements of
A can be added to the state estimate vector described by Eqn. 3.20.
Much like the final-time-fixed case, it is essential that all available information
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about the system is applied. Assuming the same form for A as provided in Sec-
tion II.C, the new parameters to estimate become a1 and a2. For the time-invariant
case, the state equation describing these new parameters are simply a˙1 = a˙2 = 0.
The behavior learning state estimate vector is then augmented such that
x = [z1, z2, z3, z4, k1, k2, a1, a2] , (3.22)
x = [x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8] , (3.23)
and the state equation vector becomes
f =

x3x7
x4x8
x1x5 + x3x6 + up1
x5x7 + x4x6 + up2
0
0
0
0

. (3.24)
No additional measurements are available, therefore the form of Eqn. 3.21 remains
the same. For this infinite-horizon, uncertain information example, the observabil-
ity matrix O is of full rank. This form of the behavior learning algorithm will be
implemented by the pursuer for the uncertain information case.
III.D. Augemented Strategy
When an agent is enabled with behavior learning in an infinite-horizon scenario,
it is possible for that agent to turn the pursuit-evasion game into a one-sided optimal
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control problem, just like the final-time-fixed scenario. The objective is to estimate
the opponent’s strategy then use that information to play more effectively by pre-
dicting the opponent’s behavior with the behavior learning solution. By taking on
the pursuer’s perspective, it becomes apparent that the pursuer is interested in es-
timating the evader’s constant Kalman gain, Ke. Once Ke is known, then the new
one-sided optimal control problem for the pursuer becomes
JPinf = min
1
2
∫ ∞
t0
(
zTQz + uTpRpup
)
dt , (3.25)
subject to the modified system
z˙ = (A+BKe) z +Bup . (3.26)
Following the same augmentation process as the final-time-fixed case, the Hamil-
tonian is formed and the stationarity condition coupled with the costate equation
solution yields the same feedback control law given by Eqns. 2.16 and 2.18. For the
infinite-horizon framework, S is found using
0 = Q+ (A+BKe)
T S + S (A+BKe)− SBR−1p BTS . (3.27)
which still takes on the form of an ARE. Note the Q, and Rp here are the pursuer’s
assumed gains and different from those which are estimated by the pursuer and
assumed by the evader.
III.E. Implementation
A behavior learning filter for an infinite-horizon scenario reduces to a much
simpler implementation than that employed for the final-time-fixed case. This is
67
because the independent elements of Kalman gain matrix are constant. If enough
knowledge can be applied to the system, it was shown in Sect. III.B that the number
of independent Kalman gain elements can be reduced to two.
Using the same extended Kalman filter framework reviewed in Sect. III.B, an
incomplete information version of this filter for the infinite-horizon case can be im-
plemented using Eqns. 3.20 and 3.21. Similarly, the uncertain information behavior
learning filter uses Eqns. 3.24 and 3.21.
III.E.1. Incomplete Information Results
The incomplete information example shown in Section III.A was simulated again
but this time with an EKF version of the behavior learning algorithm running. At t =
1, a new optimal control solution was computed by the pursuer using the augmented
strategy defined in Section III.D. Figures III.11 - III.15 convey the results for the
incomplete information behavior learning case. By computing a new solution based
the the behavior learning results, the pursuer was able to reduce its total cost to
2.3957× 105 while the evader’s cost was computed to be 2.4772× 105, compared to
the non-behavior learning values of 7.5409 × 1046 and 7.5037 × 1046 for the purser
and evader, respectively.
The pursuer’s behavior learning algorithm provided effective gain estimates de-
scribing the influence of k1 and k2 on the system shown in Fig. III.14. A comparison
of the cost and cost-to-go for the complete, incomplete, and incomplete with behavior
learning cases in Fig. III.15.
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Figure III.11. Infinite-Horizon, Incomplete Information with Behavior
Learning Aerial View
Figure III.12. Infinite-Horizon, Incomplete Information with Behavior
Learning Relative States
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Figure III.13. Infinite-Horizon, Incomplete Information with Behavior
Learning Cost Analysis
Figure III.14. Infinite-Horizon, Incomplete Information with Behavior
Learning K Estimates
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Figure III.15. Infinite-Horizon, Incomplete Information Cumulative Cost
Comparison
III.E.2. Uncertain Information Results
The uncertain information example shown in Section I.A was simulated again
but this time with an EKF version of the behavior learning algorithm running. At t =
2, a new optimal control solution was computed by the pursuer using the augmented
strategy defined in Section III.D. Figures III.16 - III.21 convey the results for the
behavior learning case. By computing a new solution based the the behavior learning
results, the pursuer was able to reduce its total cost to 2.4221×107 while the evader’s
cost was computed to be 2.4946× 107 compared to the non-behavior learning values
of 3.8193× 1060 and 3.7995× 1060 for the pursuer and evader, respectively.
The pursuer’s behavior learning algorithm was able to provide effective estimates
for k1 and k2 as shown in Fig. III.19. Moreover, the estimates of the independent
elements found within model matrix A provided reasonable estimates as evident from
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Fig. III.20. A comparison of the cost and cost-to-go for the complete information,
incomplete information, and incomplete information with behavior learning cases in
Fig. III.21.
Figure III.16. Infinite-Horizon, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning Aerial View
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Figure III.17. Infinite-Horizon, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning Relative States
Figure III.18. Infinite-Horizon, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning Cost Analysis
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Figure III.19. Infinite-Horizon, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning K Estimates
Figure III.20. Infinite-Horizon, Uncertain Information with Behavior
Learning A Estimates
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Figure III.21. Final-Time-Fixed, Uncertain Information Cumulative Cost
Comparison
III.F. Summary
Figure III.22 shows a cumulative cost comparison for all five cases of the infinite-
horizon pursuit-evasion game. In both the incomplete and uncertain information
cases, behavior learning was able to increase the pursuer’s performance when a new
solution was computed. Note the time of strategy augmentation for the pursuer
occurs at t = 1 for the incomplete information case and t = 2 for the uncertain
information case. The pursuer’s final cost summary is shown in Table III.1.
Infinite-horizon behavior learning can be computationally more efficient due to
the fact that the unique elements found within the Kalman gain matrix are constant
which simplifies things from a behavior estimation perspective. However, it was
shown that the the behavior learning filter converged on effective gains for k1 and
k2 that were not necessarily the true gains. Still, this confirms that the behavior
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Figure III.22. Infinite-Horizon, Cumulative Cost Comparison Summary
Table III.1. Planar Game Infinite-Horizon Cost Summary
Information Type Pursuer Cost
Complete 3.4449× 106
Incomplete 7.5409× 1046
Uncertain 3.8193× 1060
Incomplete + BL 2.3957× 105
Uncertain + BL 2.4221× 107
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learning framework can be effective even if the true behavior of the opponent is not
perfectly modeled. All a player needs to do is develop a model that is representative
of their opponent’s behavior. If a model can be converged upon, then the player has
the opportunity to play more effectively than simply using a zero-sum safe strategy.
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CHAPTER IV
FINAL-TIME-FREE BEHAVIOR LEARNING
Pursuit-evasion games of the final-time-free nature are not often studied. De-
pending on the performance index, these types of scenarios most often reduce to
minimum-time games. One major hurdle issue with minimum-time pursuit-evasion
games is that a final-state constraint is used to completely define the problem. These
final state constraints usually define interception or rendezvous and can only be valid
if the pursuer is guaranteed to capture the evader. That is, the pursuer must be more
agile than the evader. This chapter will develop a minimum-time pursuit-evasion
game and discuss how behavior learning can be used to help the pursuer compute
his control for an incomplete information game.
IV.A. Minimum-Time Pursuit-Evasion
Consider a scalar, minimum-time pursuit-evasion game defined by the perfor-
mance index
Jmin =
∫ tf
t0
dt , (4.1)
and the state equation
x¨ = up − ue , (4.2)
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where x represents the relative state between the pursuer and the evader. Each
player is subject to control constraints which are defined by
|up| ≤ 1 , (4.3)
|ue| ≤ Ke . (4.4)
By defining the relative state and its rate as x = z1 and x˙ = z2, the solution must
satisfy the final state constraint
zf =
z1f
z2f
 = 0 , (4.5)
where the subscript f denotes the state at the final time, tf .
The pursuer’s goal is to minimize the amount of time it takes to satisfy the final-
state constraint while the evader wants to maximize the amount of time necessary.
Because of these similar but opposite objectives, this can be defined as a zero-sum,
minimum-time pursuit-evasion game. Both players will exert their maximum allow-
able control due to the minimum-time nature of the problem and because there is
no weighting present on any control variables in the performance index. In order
for the final-state constraint to be satisfied and for a solution to exist, the pursuer
must have more control authority or be more agile than the evader. Mathematically,
Ke < 1. The solution will be of the bang-bang type that is typical of minimum-time
problems. The PE solution requires the switching function to be found [3].
The Hamiltonian can be written as
H = 1 + λ1z˙1 + λ2z˙2 = 1 + λ1z2 + λ2up − λ2ue . (4.6)
By inspection of Eqn. 4.6, if the goal is for the pursuer (evader) to minimize (max-
imize) the Hamiltonian, then the switching function for both players is dependent
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upon the sign associated with λ2. We can conclude
if λ2 < 0 then up = 1, ue = Ke , (4.7)
if λ2 > 0 then up = −1, ue = −Ke . (4.8)
From the costate equations, it follows
∂H
∂z1
= −λ˙1 → λ˙1 = 0 , (4.9)
∂H
∂z2
= −λ˙2 → λ˙2 = −λ1 . (4.10)
The ideal solution trajectory lies on intersecting parabolas and the optimal tra-
jectory for a game of this nature utilizes two parabolas. The first parabola depends
on the initial conditions and the second parabola always intersects the final-state
constraint. For this particular example, the final state constraint is represented by
the state space origin. The shape of these parabolas are defined by the total control
input which is defined as
w = up − ue = 1−Ke . (4.11)
The parabola equations can be solved for by manipulation of the state equations
given by z˙1 = z2 and z˙2 = w.
dz1
dz2
=
dz1/dt
dz2/dt
=
z˙1
z˙2
=
z2
w
. (4.12)
Therefore,
wdz1 = z2dz2 , (4.13)
which can be integrated on both sides to produce∫ tf
t0
wdz1 =
∫ tf
t0
z2dz2 , (4.14)
w
(
z1f − z10
)
=
1
2
(
z22f − z220
)
. (4.15)
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By imposing the final-state constraint given by Eqn. 4.5, Eqn. 4.15 becomes the
trajectory parabola equation given by
wz10 =
z220
2
. (4.16)
Recall the control switching functions given by Eqns. 4.7 and 4.8. For these
cases, wmin and wmax can be defined.
wmax = w (λ2 < 0) = 1−Ke , (4.17)
wmin = w (λ2 > 0) = −1 +Ke . (4.18)
The parabolas can be plotted in the state space of z1 and z2. When wmax is used
with Eqn. 4.16, the coefficient on z10 is positive and the parabola vertex is located
on the left side of the trajectory. A negative coefficent is present on z10 when wmin is
used and the vertex is located on the right side of the parabola. Because the shape
of these trajectory parabolas are dictated by w and up is fixed for this example, the
trajectory becomes a function for the selection of Ke by the evader. Figures IV.1,
IV.2, and IV.3 illustrate these shape differences for Ke selections of 0, 0.25, and
0.75, respectively. Note that when Ke = 0, the trajectory becomes that of a simple
bang-bang minimum-time solution for a single agent because Ke = 0 represents no
evader input [3].
The path for wmin parabolas follow a downward trajectory while the wmax
parabolas follow an upward trajectory. Depending upon the initial conditions, the
game trajectory would begin a particular parabola and follow it until it met the
parabola that intersects the origin. At that instance in time, the control switches
and the game path takes the appropriate trajectory to the origin.
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Figure IV.1. Minimum-Time PE Trajectories with Ke = 0
Figure IV.2. Minimum-Time PE Trajectories with Ke = 0.25
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Figure IV.3. Minimum-Time PE Trajectories with Ke = 0.75
IV.B. Incomplete Information Behavior Learning
The optimal PE solutions begin on one trajectory parabola and continue on
it until that parabola intersects with one which leads to the origin. It is at this
intersection where the switching function λ2 crosses zero and wmax switches to wmin
or vice versa. If the switching function is not properly evaluated, then the trajectory
must remain on the new parabola until it intersects one which leads to the origin
again. Based on the trajectories shown in Fig. IV.1 - IV.3, it becomes clear that the
selection of Ke is essential to where the intersections occur and therefore necessary
to know in order for the pursuer to switch at the appropriate time.
An incomplete information minimum-time game is one in which a player is
unaware of the their opponent’s strategy. For the minimum-time case, it will be as-
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sumed that the evader plays a complete information game and can properly evaluate
the switching function. In this minimum-time example, behavior learning aims to
estimate the value of Ke which defines the control constraint imposed on the evader.
If the pursuer can estimate Ke, then the pursuer has the ability to switch control
schemes at the correct time to switch to the proper trajectory and arrive at the
final-state constraints.
For minimum-time behavior learning, the states to estimate are defined by the
vector
x =

z1
z2
Ke
 =

x1
x2
x3
 , (4.19)
where states x1 and x2 are time-varying and whose state equations are given by
z˙1 = z2 , (4.20)
z˙2 = up −Ke . (4.21)
The state equations needed for the estimator are summarized by
x˙(t) = f (x(t),u(t), t) , (4.22)
where
f =

x2
up − x3
0
 . (4.23)
Relative states are available for measurement and are defined by
y˜k = h (xk) = [x1 , x2]
T . (4.24)
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Equations 4.22 and 4.24 are in the standard form needed for an estimator. For
this particular example, a linear estimator can be used because the states appear
linearly in f . In the event the evader decides to play non-optimally, i.e. uses a value
for Ke that is less than the originally specified Ke, it would be ideal for the pursuer to
be aware of this because it would alter the optimal trajectory. Therefore, it is in the
best interest of the pursuer to continuously monitor the value used for Ke and use
a sequential linear estimator for processing. A full estimator would allow the state
measurements to be smoothed that are brought about by imperfect information and
provide an estimate of Ke needed to deal with the incomplete information.
IV.C. Summary
Behavior learning plays an important role in the minimum-time pursuit-evasion
scenario. Because of the switching nature of the state space trajectory, behavior
learning is used to estimate the gain K associated with an opponent which dic-
tates when the optimal trajectory switch occurs. When faced with an incomplete
information minimum-time game, a player runs the risk of improperly evaluating
the switching function and missing the optimal time at which to switch trajectory
parabolas.
In the presented framework, the choice of the gain Ke determines the agility or
control authority associated with the evader which in turn dictates the shape of the
state space trajectory. Depending on the complexity of the relative state equations,
the behavior learning filter could be implemented with a linear estimator.
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CHAPTER V
A MINIMUM-TIME EXAMPLE
Minimum-time optimal control problems are a specific type of final-time-free
problems in which the total time is the only factor considered in the performance
index. Problems of the minimum-time nature are ill posed without additional con-
straints because the solution would simply be the selection of a control input which
is infinite. Therefore, limits on the magnitude of the control input are specified
along with a final-state-constraint. The final-state-constraint is used to specify an
end condition so an interesting solution exists.
Three major hurdles exist in the implementation of PE games of the minimum-
time type. The first is that a final-state-constraint must be imposed to completely
define the problem, yet to do this, the pursuer must be able to catch the evader.
That is, the problem can only be properly defined if the evader is guaranteed to
be captured. Second, the control switching that occurs from the limits imposed by
on the control magnitude are undesirable, especially when more than one intelligent
agent is making decisions. The simple minimum-time problem that once had a bang-
bang solution can now undergo constant switching. Finally, the ongoing desire for
feedback solutions becomes more difficult to fulfill as minimum-time solutions are
generally open loop.
Minimum-time pursuit-evasion problems have the potential to be applicable to
several types of aerospace related scenarios. The most popular military applica-
tion would be the missile interception problem which is traditionally solved using a
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final-time-fixed approach. Other examples include minimum-time orbit transfer for
spacecraft rendezvous and asset allocation for a team of UAVs tasked with track-
ing multiple targets. Because of the potential implications behavior-learning could
have on minimum-time solutions to these types of scenarios, the simple case still has
merit. This chapter will present an academic minimum-time problem based on the
principles proposed in Ch. V.
V.A. Model
Consider an agent which undergoes rectilinear motion and is influenced by
acceleration-level control,
x¨i = ui . (5.1)
If the state vector is defined as
zi = [x, x˙] , (5.2)
then the vector-matrix form of the agent’s equations of motion can be written as
z˙ = Azi +Bui , (5.3)
where
A =
0 1
0 0
 and B =
0
1
 . (5.4)
If a pursuing and evading agent both behave according to Eqn. 5.3 and the
relative state vector is defined as
z = zp − ze , (5.5)
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then the relative model can be written as
z˙ = Az +Bup −Bue . (5.6)
V.B. Minimum-Time Pursuit-Evasion
The final-time-free, zero-sum pursuit-evasion game is defined by the performance
index
J =
∫ tf
t0
dt , (5.7)
and subject to the dynamic constraint given by Eqn. 5.6. The initial conditions are
given by
z0 =
z10
z20
 . (5.8)
and the final state constraints are specified as
zf =
z1f
z2f
 =
0
0
 . (5.9)
Additionally, the control input for each player is subject to the constraints
|up| ≤ 1 , (5.10)
|ue| ≤ Ke . (5.11)
The goal is to drive the relative position and velocity between the two players
to zero while satisfying the control constraints. The pursuer aims to do this in
minimum-time while the pursuer wishes to maximize Eqn. 5.7 and therefore do this
in maximum-time. In order for a solution to exist, Ke must satisfy Ke < 1, otherwise,
the final-state-constraint cannot be satisfied. Note that this formulation is the same
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as that posed in Section IV.A. The solution is given by Eqns. 4.7 and 4.8 while the
costate equations are shown in Eqns. 4.9 and 4.10.
The costate λ2 is a function of time that can be written as
λ2 = λ1 (t− t0) + λ20 = λ1 (tf − t) + λ2f . (5.12)
Note from Eqn. 5.12 that the switching function is a linear function of time and can
therefore change sign once, at most.
Recall Isaacs’ push for feedback solutions to pursuit-evasion games. By defining
w = up − ue, we can manipulate the switching function based on the sign of λ2 into
a feedback switching function. If
z˙2 = w , (5.13)
then it follows
z2 = w (t− t0) + z20 = w (t− tf ) + z2f . (5.14)
The terminal conditions are defined as z1f = z2f = 0 therefore Eqn. 5.14 reduces to
z2 = w (t− tf ) . (5.15)
Integration of z2 yields
z1 =
w (t− tf )2
2
=
z22
2w
, (5.16)
and solving for w in terms of z1 and z2 gives
w =
z22
2z1
. (5.17)
Equation 5.17 can be rewritten as
sgn (w) abs (w) =
z22
2z1
. (5.18)
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Note that Eqn. 5.17 is consistent with the parabola equation given by Eqn. 4.16.
The parabola plots shown in Figs. IV.1 - IV.3 can be used with the help of the
parabola equation to form the feedback control solution in terms of z1 and z2. From
the switching curve it can be concluded that above the curve, w = wmin, and below
the curve, w = wmax, because sgn (wmin) = −1 and sgn (wmax) = +1. Together with
Eqn. 5.18, the feedback solution is given by
w = wmax if
[
z22sgn (z2) < −2z1abs (wmax)
]
or
[
z22sgn (z2) = −2z1abs (wmax) , z1 > 0
]
,
w = wmin if
[
z22sgn (z2) > −2z1abs (wmin)
]
or
[
z22sgn (z2) = −2z1abs (wmin) , z1 < 0
]
, (5.19)
where
wmax = 1−Ke , (5.20)
wmin = −1 +Ke . (5.21)
V.C. Behavior Learning
For the type of game presented, it was revealed in Chapter IV that behavior
learning can be used by the pursuer to estimate the evader’s selection of Ke. For this
minimum-time pursuit evasion game, we will explore the effects of behavior learning
with slightly different assumptions on the evader’s game play. The evader will always
play a complete, perfect, and certain information game. That is, the evader will
know precisely the pursuer’s control bounds, up = ±1. Additionally, the evader’s
measurements of the relative states z1 and z2 will free of measurement noise. There
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are no uncertainties present in the evader’s relative model. These characteristics of
the evader will remain fixed for all simulations. For the imperfect information case,
the evader may switch too early or too late which can cause oscillating behavior
especially when it occurs near the true switch time. Although this would be a more
realistic situation, it distracts the reader from the usefulness of behavior learning in
the minimum-time case.
The evaluation of w given by Eqn. 5.19 dictates which value for up is selected by
the pursuer. The value of Ke plays an important role in this determination which is
done independently by the pursuer and the evader. The switching function is used
so the pursuer can jump to the proper trajectory to the state-space origin at the
correct time. If this switching function is not properly evaluated, then the pursuer
will not be able to switch at the correct time to drive the relative states to the origin
in minimum-time.
When the pursuer is subject to an incomplete, imperfect, certain information
game, the states to be estimated become those given by Eqn. 4.19. The state equa-
tions are given by Eqn. 4.23 and the measurements of the relative states are summa-
rized in Eqn. 4.24. Because the state equations and measurements are both linear
functions of the states given by Eqn. 4.19, a linear estimator can be used to estimate
the time varying parameters z1 and z2 along with the constant control bound of the
evader given by Ke. In the event that the evader decides to play non-optimally, i.e.
use |ue| < Ke, then it is in the best interest of the pursuer to continuously monitor
the estimate x3 = Ke so the switching function can always be properly evaluated.
Therefore, the pursuer wishes to filter the states z1 and z2 while estimating the pa-
91
rameter Ke. For these reasons, a standard Kalman filter is used for behavior learning
in this example.
V.D. Simulation
The initial conditions for each player were chosen to be
zp0 =
2.5
1
 , and ze0 =
 1
0.5
 , (5.22)
which produce the relative initial conditions
z0 =
1.5
0.5
 . (5.23)
Three sets of simulation results are presented for the minimum-time behavior
learning example. The complete information case is used as a baseline to show how
the game should play out in the ideal scenario. The incomplete information case is
used to show the consequences of the pursuer not being able to properly evaluate
the switching function. Finally, an incomplete information example with the pursuer
enabled with behavior learning is shown to illustrate the usefulness of these methods
for the minimum-time example.
For the incomplete information examples, the pursuer is also subject to im-
perfect information. In incomplete information simulations, the pursuer’s relative
state measurements are subject to a zero-mean Gaussian noise distribution with a
standard deviation of σ = 0.001.
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V.D.1. Complete Information
The results for the complete information simulation are shown in Figs. V.1 - V.3.
This example used a true value of Ke = 0.2 which was known by both players. The
state space trajectory is shown in Fig. V.1 along with the optimal trajectories that
were generated using Ke = 0.2. The game trajectory after the switching point which
leads to the origin resides slightly lower than the actual optimal trajectory. In theory,
this does not occur because the exact switching time can be computed. However, in
practice, simulation are forced to rely on discrete time. As the simulation timestep
approaches zero, the game trajectory converges on the optimal trajectory.
Figure V.1. Complete Information State Space Trajectory
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Figure V.2 contains the pursuer, evader, and relative states. Note that at the
final time tf = 3.503 seconds, the relative states go to zero. The pursuer control,
up, evader control, ue, and total control, w, are illustrated in Fig. V.3. The pursuer
and evader are both able to properly evaluate the switching function and therefore
switch in unison.
Figure V.2. Complete Information States
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Figure V.3. Complete Information Control Input
V.D.2. Incomplete Information
For the incomplete information case, the pursuer continued to assume Ke = 0.2
but the evader’s control constraint was actually Ke = 0.4. The results for these
assumptions are found in Figs. V.4 - V.6. The state space trajectory is shown in
Fig. V.4 along with the optimal trajectory assumed by the pursuer using Ke = 0.2
and the actual optimal trajectory given by Ke = 0.4. Figure V.5 contains the states
given by the incomplete information case and the control input is shown in Fig. V.6.
Figures V.4 and V.6 show that the pursuer assumes it is on the wrong trajectory
given by Ke = 0.2 and switches after the evader causing the trajectory to deviate
from the optimal trajectory. Because the pursuer switches too late, the resulting
trajectory is parallel to that of the optimal trajectory and the switching function must
be evaluated again in order to get to the proper trajectory to the origin. This cycle
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Figure V.4. Incomplete Information State Space Trajectory
continues until the system finally converges. The presence of incomplete information
raises the final time from tf = 3.503 to tf = 6.820.
V.D.3. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning
The incomplete information case was simulated again with the pursuer using a
Kalman filter for behavior learning. These results are shown in Figs. V.7 - V.10 using
the same selections for Ke as in the incomplete information simulation. With the
use behavior learning, the evader is able to estimate the true value of Ke using its
own assumption as the initial guess as illustrated in Fig. V.10. Even though K˙e = 0
is exact, a considerable amount of process noise was needed on that parameter to
ensure a short transient time after the control switch. This is desirable in case the
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Figure V.5. Incomplete Information States
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Figure V.6. Incomplete Information Control Input
evader decides to play with a non-optimal selection of Ke.
Figure V.7 confirms that the switching function was properly evaluated by both
players at the optimal trajectory was taken. The final time with behavior learning
implemented was tf = 4.209. The discrepancy between this final time and that of
the complete information case is because the complete information case uses a true
Ke of 0.2 while the incomplete version uses Ke = 0.4. This was done to show the
trajectory that the pursuer expected.
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Figure V.7. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning State Space
Trajectory
99
Figure V.8. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning States
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Figure V.9. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning Control In-
put
Figure V.10. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning Estimate
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V.E. Summary
A comparison of the complete, incomplete, and behavior learning minimum-
time trajectories are shown in Fig. V.11. When a player incorrectly assumes their
opponent’s control input, it becomes impossible to properly evaluate the switching
function and the evolution of the state space path is forced to take a sub-optimal
trajectory. The process noise associated with the gain Ke in the behavior learning
estimator was intentionally set high in order to accommodate the switching na-
ture of the control. The final cost summary is shown in Table V.1. Although the
Figure V.11. Minimum-Time State Space Trajectories
minimum-time problem presented here is a purely academic example, it is apparent
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Table V.1. Minimum-Time Game Cost Summary
Information Type Pursuer Cost
Complete 3.503
Incomplete 6.820
Incomplete + BL 4.209
how behavior learning can play an important role in final-time-free PE games which
are subject to incomplete information. In practice, additional issues arise such as
missing the proper switching time due to the chosen discrete time step size. As
the time step between measurements increases, the time between when the switch
should occur and when the switch is properly evaluated increases. As the update
rate increases, this issue becomes less prevalent.
One other concern includes improper evaluation of the switching function based
on the imperfect nature of state measurements subject to noise. When zero-mean
white noise is added to the measurements, a player could think the switch should
occur then re-evaluate such that the switch should not occur at the next time step.
As the magnitude of the additive noise increases, so does the probability that this
phenomenon will occur. This issue has a cascading effect when behavior learning is
enabled because a player estimates their opponent’s behavior based on the relative
states which are driven by the control input. When the opponent continues to
incorrectly evaluate the switching function, it could have negative effects on the
player enabled with behavior learning. Because filtering of the relative states is a
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byproduct of the behavior learning framework presented, a single player can reduce
the possibility of this happening for their own switching function computation by
implementing a behavior learning filter.
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CHAPTER VI
DYNAMIC INVERSION
As outlined in the previous chapters, feedback solutions are critical for PE sce-
narios. The need for closed-loop control has shaped the discussion around games that
are linear-quadratic in nature. Before continuing, an important detail must be ad-
dressed concerning real-world dynamic systems. In the aerospace industry, dynamic
systems are most commonly nonlinear which can be problematic when approaching a
PE game which requires a feedback solution. Therefore, a reliable method is needed
to help transform common nonlinear systems, including Euler’s rotational equations
of motion or a those describing a vehicle in flight, into their linear counterpart such
that they fit into the framework of a linear-quadratic pursuit-evasion game.
Over the years, techniques have been developed to aid in the control of vehicles
whose motion is described by nonlinear differential equations. The most common
method involves linearization by taking partial derivatives of the nonlinear equations
about equilibrium points. If a vehicle can stay within a certain motion envelope, these
techniques can hold true. Linearization can be performed both analytically [31] or
experimentally [32]. The drawback to this method, however, is that the states that
are of interest in a pursuit-evasion game are often not the same states that make
up the linearized model. For example, the linearized model for an aircraft in flight
is based upon the Euler angles that make up the aircraft’s attitude, and for good
reason. The stability of an air vehicle is very important in order for it to maintain
desired, stable, flight characteristics. However, most often the position of a vehicle
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is of interest in a PE scenario.
Another tool used to provide a linear transformation for a naturally nonlin-
ear system is dynamic inversion [33]. The method of dynamic inversion allows the
engineer to select a desired, linear system response and subsequently compute the
necessary control input for the nonlinear system to achieve the desired response.
This method has been shown to be useful in the control of highly maneuverable ve-
hicles [34], its stability and robustness verified [35–37], and it has even been used on
flight tests of advanced military applications [5].
VI.A. Model
The method of dynamic inversion can be very useful when applied to general-
ized nonlinear equations of motion. Consider the nonlinear differential equations of
motion for a single player which take on the form
q =
[
rT , sT
]T
, (6.1)
r˙ = H (r) s , (6.2)
s˙ = f (r, s) +G (s)v , (6.3)
where r, s,f ∈ Rn, v ∈ Rm, H ∈ Rn×n, and G ∈ Rn×m.
Vector q is the state vector with r and s representing the position and velocity
level variables, respectively. Vector v signifies the control input. The kinematics and
dynamics are defined by Eqn. 6.2 and Eqn. 6.3, respectively, while vector and matrix
functions f(r, s), G(s), and H(r) may or may not be nonlinear. This particular class
of systems is affine in the controls meaning the the control input appears linearly in
the nonlinear state differential equations. This form is common among aerospace sys-
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tems and therefore the following discussion will be limited to control-affine nonlinear
systems.
Nonlinear optimal control problems, including solutions to PE games, become
significantly more difficult when the optimal solution must adhere to a nonlinear dy-
namic constraint. Analytical, closed-form feedback solutions to the optimal control
problem are desired. Therefore, it is of particular interest to find useful transforma-
tions to map the relationships found in Eqns. 6.2 and 6.3 to suitable linear versions.
To accomplish this, a two-step dynamic inversion process is used.
VI.B. Method
Dynamic inversion is applicable to nth-order nonlinear systems that are control-
affine like those found in Eqn. 6.3 [5]. Consider a desired linear dynamic model,
defined as s˙des, which can be prescribed later for whichever system we choose. To
force the nonlinear system to follow the dynamics of the desired linear model, set
the right hand side of Eqn. 6.3 equal to the desired dynamic model and solve for the
control input vector.
s˙des = f +Gv ,
v = G−1 [s˙des − f ] . (6.4)
Equation 6.4 is used to compute the control input vector v required to make the
nonlinear dynamics in Eqn. 6.3 behave as those prescribed by s˙des. Note that the
matrix function G must be invertible. If G is square then m = n and the number of
control inputs for the original system are equal to the number of position coordinates.
Inversion is possible if it is of full rank. A minimum norm solution can also be used
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if m > n which is representative of an over-actuated system. This makes sense
because if we wish to drive the relative position states to zero, we need at least that
many control inputs to have enough control authority to maneuver the system. Still,
the possibility for nonlinear kinematics exists as given by Eqn. 6.2. The concept of
dynamic inversion can be applied a second time to this system.
Again, consider the desired dynamics w that are yet to be specified. By setting
this desired behavior equal to the time derivative of the right hand side of Eqn. 6.2
and substituting the desired s˙des, it is possible to compute the consistent s˙des based
on the specified w.
w = r¨ ,
w = H˙s+Hs˙ ,
w = H˙s+Hs˙des ,
s˙des = H
−1
[
w − H˙s
]
. (6.5)
Applying two-step dynamic inversion to the specific class of systems described
by Eqns. 6.2 and 6.3 yields a convenient double integrator problem. First, w is
chosen and is used for the pursuit-evasion optimal control solution. Then, Eqn. 6.5
is used to compute the consistent s˙des for the double integrator framework. Finally,
Eqn. 6.4 is used to compute the actual input to the original system. Each variable
is evaluated using the current states at the current timestep. Note that the actual
system still behaves according to Eqn. 6.3 which is used to simulate the evolution
of motion in computer-based applications. This two-step process rids the system
of the complications associated with nonlinear kinematics and allows for a double-
integrator form for the equations of motion. It is important to note that for the
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common kinematic relationship r˙ = s, H takes on the form of an identity matrix
then s˙des is simply equal to w.
Upon implementation, dynamic inversion creates a main outer control loop and
a dynamic inversion inner control loop which usual runs at a faster rate. The main
outer control is computed using the desired dynamics defined by w, like that from a
pursuit-evasion game, then those results are used to compute the necessary input v
for the inner control loop. Dynamic inversion has been proven to be very useful when
the execution rate is fast enough to deal with the system nonlinearities [5]. It is not
uncommon for the inner control loop to run at a rate an order of magnitude greater
than the outer control loop. The desired dynamics, w, would remain constant during
the extra computational steps of the inner control loop and updated at its own rate
as necessary.
The dynamic inversion process is used to provide a linear transformation for a
single vehicle or player. To form the relative equations of motion needed for the PE
dynamic constraint, it is necessary to perform two-step dynamic inversion for each
system.
VI.C. Relative Model
If the original system for Player i is nonlinear, the desired linear representation
could be selected as
wi = ui =
ui1
ui2
 , (6.6)
which represents a system with acceleration level control under the influence of no
external forces.
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For a point mass system moving in the horizontal plane, the linear representation
of the state vector and its time derivative are then written as
zi = [xi, yi, x˙i, y˙i]
T = [zi1 , zi2 , zi3 , zi4 ]
T , (6.7)
z˙i = [zi3 , zi4 , ui1 , ui2 ]
T . (6.8)
In vector-matrix form, Eqn. 6.8 becomes
z˙i = Azi +Bui , (6.9)
where
A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, B =

0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1

. (6.10)
When the pursuer and evader are both modeled by Eqn. 6.9 and therefore have
the same system matrices A and B, the relative equations of motion can be formed
as
zr = zp − ze , (6.11)
z˙r = z˙p − z˙e = Azp +Bup − Aze −Bue , (6.12)
z˙r = A [zp − ze] +Bup −Bue , (6.13)
z˙r = Azr +Bup −Bue , (6.14)
where subscripts p and e denote states and control inputs of the pursuer and evader,
respectively. The relative differential equations found in Eqn. 6.14 define the dynamic
constraint for a PE game between Player p and Player e. Because dynamic inversion
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is used to produce a linear constraint, familiar feedback solutions to linear optimal
control problems such as the linear-quadratic regulator can be applied.
Note that it is not always the case that the relative equations of motion take on
the exact form shown in Eqn. 6.14. For example, a spacecraft reorientation PE game
will be studied later which takes into account the relative attitude and attitude rates.
Special attention must be paid to systems whose relative states cannot be computed
using a simple difference relation like that in Eqn. 6.11. The relative attitude and
the associated rates must be computed consistently using the necessary form of the
attitude influence matrix [38].
VI.D. Summary
Although the robustness of dynamic inversion has been verified in certain ap-
plications [36], it must be used with caution and its robustness examined on a case-
by-case basis. Depending on the selection of the desired linear dynamics and the
feasibility of those dynamics by the true nonlinear system, there exists the possibil-
ity that what is being requested of the system is unobtainable. In the most extreme
cases, the choice for the desired dynamics may produce undesirable system charac-
teristics which may include control saturation or system instability.
Control saturation is brought about by large magnitudes being required in or-
der for the nonlinear system to behave like the desired system. Control saturation
can become catastrophic for nonlinear systems that are already inherently unstable.
These large magnitudes may also produce system oscillations and can lead to system
instability.
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It is essential to cautiously select the desired linear response w. Most often,
selections which yield a damped linear response perform much better than those
selection which do not. Nevertheless, some agility must be sacrificed when selecting
a particular stable response. For example, instead of a model matrix A, A∗ could be
selected for a more obtainable desired system.
A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
−k 0 −c 0
0 −k 0 −c

, (6.15)
where k and c are positive.
The method of two-step dynamic inversion for nonlinear systems presented can
be extremely useful when applied to pursuit-evasion games if its application is ex-
ercised with caution. The selection of w is critical for complex systems in which
stability could become an issue.
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CHAPTER VII
APPLICATIONS: SPACECRAFT PROXIMITY OPERATIONS
Recently, automated spacecraft proximity operations has become a major area
of interest among government and private entities. Several factors have been the
major driving force behind these research interests including automated removal of
space debris, servicing of damaged spacecraft, re-purposing of out-of-date satellites
by means of on-orbit disassembly and assembly, resupply of the International Space
Station by private companies, and reconnaissance missions involving uncooperative
spacecraft. Many of these factors can be adapted to fit the framework of a pursuit-
evasion scenario. Spacecraft differential games have been developed [39] and solutions
to the optimal guidance laws presented [40]. However, these pursuit-evasion results
are limited to final-time-fixed and restricted to the complete information case.
Consider a space-based reconnaissance mission involving two spacecraft which
are modeled as rigid bodies and whose attitude is defined through three degrees-
of-freedom. The spacecraft are non-cooperative and the objective for the pursuer
spacecraft is to match the attitude and angular velocities of the second evader space-
craft. That is, the pursuer spacecraft wants to drive the relative attitude error to
zero while simultaneously driving the relative angular velocities to zero. The pursuer
wishes to accomplish this task for an undetermined amount of time making a game
of this nature best suited for an infinite-horizon PE scenario.
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VII.A. Model
First, consider the attitude kinematics and dynamics of each vehicle individually.
The attitude can be represented by several choices of attitude coordinates including
Euler angles, Euler parameters, the classic Rodrigues parameters (CRPs), modified
Rodrigues parameters (MRPs), or the principle vector and angle. The selection of
attitude coordinates is important because they can make the problem more or less
convenient with the implementation of dynamic inversion.
For this problem, the CRPs are used for two reasons. The first is that they
are a minimum attitude representation meaning three parameters are used to define
the three degrees-of-freedom associated with the attitude. This is important because
the attitude influence matrix which relates the angular velocity to the attitude rates
is square [38]. A square matrix is necessary for a valid implementation of dynamic
inversion. It is possible for a four parameter set to be chosen such as the Euler
parameters but this requires the kinematic constraint to be appended to the attitude
influence matrix. For these reasons, a minimum attitude set is desired.
The second reason the CRPs are chosen in favor of the MRPs is that minimum
attitude sets are susceptible to singularities. The MRPs have an orientation singular-
ity when the principal angle φ = ±2pi. This is undesirable because once the relative
attitude is formed, this corresponds to when the pursuer matches the evader’s atti-
tude exactly, which is the goal. Because the game is defined as infinite-horizon, the
pursuer intends to hold the desired relative attitude at zero infinitely. The CRPs
contain an orientation singularity when φ = ±pi. When considering the relative atti-
tude, This singularity corresponds to when the two vehicles have the absolute most
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attitude error. This can be avoided if the pursuer has more control authority than
the evader and the initial conditions are defined such that the relative φ 6= ±pi.
Another solution to these issues would be to use a shadow set of coordinates
such as the shadow MRPs. These attitude coordinates always avoid the orientation
singularity by computing the attitude one of two ways. The drawback of this selection
is it would introduce inconsistencies in the attitude description and could negatively
affect the feedback solutions to the PE game.
By defining the attitude and angular velocity vectors for player i as
qi = [qi1 , qi2 , qi3 ]
T , (7.1)
ωi = [ωi1 , ωi2 , ωi3 ]
T , (7.2)
the attitude kinematics for the CRPs are defined for a single vehicle as
q˙i = Hiωi , (7.3)
where qi represents the CRPs and ωi represents the body angular velocities with
respect to the inertial reference frame, resolved in the body-fixed reference frame.
The attitude influence matrix, Hi, is a function of the attitude coordinates and takes
on the form
Hi =
1
2

1 + q2i1 qi1qi2 − qi3 qi1qi3 + qi2
qi1qi2 + qi3 1 + q
2
i2
qi2qi3 − qi1
qi1qi3 − qi2 qi2qi3 + qi1 1 + q2i3
 . (7.4)
If the moment of inertia tensor and the torque input vector are of the form
Ii =

Ii1 0 0
0 Ii2 0
0 0 Ii3
 , and `i =

`i1
`i2
`i3
 , (7.5)
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respectively, then Euler’s rotational equations of motion for a rotating rigid body
provide the attitude dynamics which are given by
ω˙i1 =
1
Ii1
(Ii2 − Ii3)ωi2ωi3 +
1
Ii1
`i1 , (7.6)
ω˙i2 =
1
Ii2
(Ii3 − Ii1)ωi1ωi3 +
1
Ii2
`i2 , (7.7)
ω˙i3 =
1
Ii3
(Ii1 − Ii2)ωi1ωi2 +
1
Ii3
`i3 . (7.8)
Both the attitude kinematics and rotational dynamics are nonlinear for a single
vehicle. Therefore, we wish to impose dynamic inversion in an effort to put the
equations of motion into a form that can be used for the implementation of a pursuit-
evasion game with feedback solutions and behavior learning elements. The dynamics
can be rewritten as
ω˙i = fi +Givi , (7.9)
where
fi =

1
Ii1
(Ii2 − Ii3)ωi2ωi3
1
Ii2
(Ii3 − Ii1)ωi1ωi3
1
Ii3
(Ii1 − Ii2)ωi1ωi2
 , Gi =

1
Ii1
0 0
0 1
Ii2
0
0 0 1
Ii3
 , (7.10)
and
vi = [`i1 , `i2 , `i3 ]
T . (7.11)
Equations 7.3 and 7.9 now take on the same form as the model used for dynamic
inversion in Eqns. 6.2 and 6.3. By applying two-step dynamic inversion, the necessary
consistent angular velocity vector, ω˙ic , is defined as
ω˙ic = H
−1
i
[
q¨idesired − H˙iωi
]
, (7.12)
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and the true control input can be computed using
vi = G
−1
i [ω˙ic − fi] . (7.13)
In Eqns. 7.12 and 7.13, ωi and fi are evaluated using the current angular velocity,
Gi is constant, Hi is evaluated using the current attitude, and H˙i is evaluated at the
current attitude and attitude rates using
H˙i =
1
2
q˙i1

2qi1 qi2 qi3
qi2 0 −1
qi3 1 0
+ q˙i2

0 qi1 1
qi1 2qi2 qi3
−1 qi3 0
+ q˙i3

0 −1 qi1
1 0 qi2
qi1 qi2 2qi3

 .
(7.14)
By imposing this two-step process to remove the kinematic and dynamic nonlin-
earities, we are free to choose q¨idesired as we see fit. Note that through this dynamic
inversion process, the attitude rates are used in place of the angular velocities and
the desired dynamics are imposed on the the coordinates directly. This is done in
the pursuit-evasion control computation and the dynamic inversion relations given
by Eqns. 7.12 and 7.13 are used to compute the actual required controls for each
system based on the desired attitude dynamics.
Direct control of each attitude coordinate is possible by defining
q¨idesired = ui = [ui1 , ui2 , ui3 ]
T . (7.15)
If player i ’s state vector is
zi = [qi1 , qi2 , qi3 , q˙i1 , q˙i2 , q˙i3 ]
T , (7.16)
then the vector-matrix form for single player EoMs become
z˙i = Azi +Bui , (7.17)
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where
A =

0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

, B =

0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

. (7.18)
Two-step dynamic inversion is imposed on both players to allow for a linear
formulation of the attitude dynamics. The attitude and dynamics of each individual
vehicle is defined with respect to the inertial reference frame. For the PE game,
the relative attitude equations must be formed. During implementation, special
consideration must be given to the relative attitude when also keeping track of the
inertial attitude of each player.
Even with the implementation of dynamic inversion on each vehicle individually,
the relative attitude kinematics and dynamics still exhibit nonlinearities due to the
relationship between the body angular velocities and the attitude coordinate rates.
To push the limits of behavior learning, an invalid assumption will be made pertaining
to the relative attitude model. It will be assumed that the relative attitude dynamics
behave linearly, which is not the case. The goal here is to show that even if the
player’s assumed model of the relative system is wrong, behavior learning can still
be effective by producing some solution that can be used to model the system. If a
player can converge on a model for their opponent’s behavior, even if is not necessarily
the correct model, a player should have the ability to perform better than by simply
employing a zero-sum safe strategy.
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The relative attitude coordinates of the pursuer with respect to the evader are
defined as
q = [q1, q2, q3]
T . (7.19)
The invalid assumption is that the acceleration of the attitude coordinates can be
written linearly in terms of the pursuer and evader inputs as
q¨ = up − ue . (7.20)
Following this assumption, writing the relative state vector as
z = [q1, q2, q3, q˙1, q˙2, q˙3]
T , (7.21)
the relative attitude dynamics can be expressed as
z˙ = Az +Bup −Bue , (7.22)
where A and B are defined in Eqn. 7.18.
VII.B. Pursuit-Evasion Game
The infinite-horizon spacecraft reorientation pursuit-evasion game is defined by
the zero-sum performance index
JSR =
1
2
∫ ∞
t0
(
zTQz + uTpRpup − uTe Reue
)
dt , (7.23)
subject to the linear dynamic constraint defined by Eqn. 7.22. The optimal solutions
are given by
up = −R−1p BTSz , (7.24)
ue = −R−1e BTSz , (7.25)
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where S is the solution to the ARE
0 = Q+ ATS + SA+ SB
(
R−1e −R−1p
)
BTS . (7.26)
VII.C. Behavior Learning
Behavior learning will attempt to estimate the evader’s Kalman gain which was
shown to be constant for the infinite-horizon case. This gain is a 3× 6 matrix with
at most 18 independent gains to estimate. The evader’s Kalman gain is defined by
Ke = R
−1
e B
TS . (7.27)
With the form of A and B known and given by Eqn. 7.18, and the reasonable
assumptions that:
• the evader implements a zero-sum safe strategy,
• the evader is not capable of bahavior learning,
• the evader weighs each of the relative coordinates equally,
• the evader weighs each of the relative coordinate rates equally,
• the evader weighs each of the control inputs equally, and
• the evader does not weigh any cross-coupling terms
the form of Ke can be reduced to
Ke =

k1 0 0 k2 0 0
0 k1 0 0 k2 0
0 0 k1 0 0 k2
 . (7.28)
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The behavior learning algorithm becomes an estimator for the relative attitude
coordinates and coordinate rates given by z, and the two independent elements of
Ke. These states are summarized by the estimate vector
x =

z1
z2
z3
z4
z5
z6
k1
k2

=

x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8

, (7.29)
where states x1 − x6 are time-varying and whose state equations are given by
z˙ = (A+BKe) z +Bup . (7.30)
The state equations needed for the nonlinear estimator are summarized by
x˙(t) = f (x(t),u(t), t) , (7.31)
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where
f =

x4
x5
x6
x1x7 + x4x8 + up1
x2x7 + x5x8 + up2
x3x7 + x6x8 + up3
0
0

, (7.32)
and up = [up1 , up2 , up3 ]
T . The measurements available are the relative states defined
by
y˜k = h (xk) = [x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , x5 , x6]
T . (7.33)
Equations 7.31 and 7.33 are in the standard form needed for a nonlinear filter.
Any of several nonlinear estimation techniques can be used to filter the relative states
and estimate the strategy parameters k1 and k2. These estimates can be continuously
monitored and the pursuer can then employ a one-sided optimal control solution.
The one-sided optimal control solution is given by Eqns. 2.16 and 2.18. If the
pursuer notices a significant change in the evader’s gains k1 or k2, Eqn 3.27 must be
used to compute a new solution for S before this information can be accounted for.
VII.D. Simulation
To develop a baseline case for comparison purposes, a complete information case
is simulated along with incomplete information and behavior learning enabled cases.
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The complete information gain selections are summarized by
Qe =

7 0 0 0 0 0
0 7 0 0 0 0
0 0 7 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

, (7.34)
Rpe =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
 , Ree =

15 0 0
0 15 0
0 0 15
 . (7.35)
For the complete information case, each player assumes a zero-sum strategy using
the gains defined in Eqns. 7.34 and 7.35.
The initial conditions for all cases were chosen to be
qp0 = [0.07, 0.02, 0.1]
T , (7.36)
qe0 = [0.25, 0.5, 0.33]
T , (7.37)
with the initial angular velocities of
wp0 = [−0.05, 0, 0.07]T rad/s, (7.38)
we0 = [0.15, −0.1, 0]T rad/s. (7.39)
These initial conditions produce a relative attitude defined by the CRP vector
qr0 = [−0.1201, −0.2593, −0.1533]T , (7.40)
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and an initial relative angular velocity of
ωr0 = [−0.20, 0.10, 0.07]T rad/s. (7.41)
The spacecraft moment of inertia tensors define equivalent near-axisymmetric
rigid bodies.
I =

1 0 0
0 2.25 0
0 0 2
 . (7.42)
Imperfect information dictates that the relative state measurements are subject
to a zero-mean Gaussian noise distribution. A standard deviation of σ = 0.005
was used on all relative state measurements which include the attitude coordinates
and coordinate rates. In practice, the relative attitude could be measured using a
stereo or laser-based imager. The relative attitude can be computed and given in
the appropriate attitude coordinates. Aided with gyros measuring inertial angular
velocity, a relative angular velocity could be estimated. Using the attitude influence
matrix, the relative coordinate rates could also be provided for computation of the
pursuit-evasion feedback control solution.
VII.D.1. Complete Information
The simulation results for the complete information case are shown in Figs. VII.1
- VII.5. Total relative attitude error is computed using
eatt = cos
−1
[
tr
(
RtR
T
e
)− 1
2
]
, (7.43)
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where tr(∗) is the trace of ∗, Rt is the desired attitude matrix which is identity, and
Re is the attitude matrix formed from the relative CRPs, q, using
Re = [1]− 2
1 + q2
[
q×
]
+
2
1 + q2
[
q×
] [
q×
]
, q2 = q21 + q
2
2 + q
2
3 . (7.44)
The relative, pursuer, and evader states for the 300 second simulation are illus-
trated in Figs. VII.1, VII.2, and VII.3, respectively. The control input which consists
of those requested by the PE solution and the actual applied torques from dynamic
inversion are shown in Fig. VII.4. The cumulative cost and cost-to-go are found in
Fig. VII.5.
After 300 seconds the relative state attitude error is 0.9472 degrees with a rel-
ative angular velocity of 0.0015 deg/s. No adverse effects result in the control input
computation from the imposed two-step dynamic inversion as evident in Fig. VII.4.
The cumulative cost and cost-to-go for the pursuer and evader are equivalent as ex-
pected from the complete information, zero-sum game. The total cost for the pursuer
and evader was computed to be 4.9093 while the cost-to-go was 0.4233× 10−3.
VII.D.2. Incomplete Information
For the incomplete information case, the pursuer’s gains remained constant and
those assumed by the evader were altered. The evader’s gains for the incomplete
125
Figure VII.1. Complete Information Relative States
Figure VII.2. Complete Information Pursuer States
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Figure VII.3. Complete Information Evader States
Figure VII.4. Complete Information Control Input
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Figure VII.5. Complete Information Relative Cost
information case are summarized by
Qe =

6.5 0 0 0 0 0
0 6.5 0 0 0 0
0 0 6.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

, (7.45)
Rpe =

1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
 , Ree =

20 0 0
0 20 0
0 0 20
 . (7.46)
The relative, pursuer, and evader states for the 300 second simulation are illus-
trated in Figs. VII.6, VII.7, and VII.8, respectively. The control input which consists
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of those requested by the PE solution and the actual applied torques from dynamic
inversion are shown in Fig. VII.9. The cumulative cost and cost-to-go are found in
Fig. VII.10.
After 300 seconds the relative state attitude error is 19.0259 degrees and with
a relative angular velocity of 0.0031 deg/s. Again, no adverse effects result in the
control input computation from the imposed two-step dynamic inversion as evident
in Fig. VII.9, verifying the selection of the desired system for this particular example.
The total cost for the pursuer was computed to be 3.6394 × 102 while that of the
evader was 4.6851 × 102. The cost-to-go at the end of 300 seconds was 0.1739 and
0.1638 for the pursuer and evader, respectively.
Figure VII.6. Incomplete Information Relative States
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Figure VII.7. Incomplete Information Pursuer States
Figure VII.8. Incomplete Information Evader States
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Figure VII.9. Incomplete Information Control Input
Figure VII.10. Incomplete Information Relative Cost
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VII.D.3. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning EKF
The objective of behavior learning for the infinite-horizon spacecraft reorienta-
tion problem involves reducing the final cost-to-go such that the slope of the cumula-
tive cost decreases when compared to the incomplete information case. Additionally,
the final attitude error and relative angular velocity at the 300 second mark should
also be reduced. Even though the behavior learning filter was used for the entire
game, the solution was recomputed a single time at t = 10 seconds.
The relative, pursuer, and evader states for the 300 second simulation are il-
lustrated in Figs. VII.11, VII.12, and VII.13, respectively. The control input which
consists of those requested by the PE solution and the actual applied torques from
dynamic inversion are shown in Fig. VII.14. The cumulative cost and cost-to-go are
found in Fig. VII.15 while the effective estimates are shown in Fig. VII.16.
After 300 seconds the relative state attitude error is 15.6157 degrees and with a
relative angular velocity of 0.0021 deg/s. No adverse effects result in the control input
computation from the imposed two-step dynamic inversion as evident in Fig. VII.9.
The total cost for the pursuer was computed to be 7.2333 × 101 while that of the
evader was 4.0062 × 102. The cost-to-go at the end of 300 seconds was 0.1608 and
0.1096 for the pursuer and evader, respectively.
Even though the gain estimates did not converge on the true gains used by the
evader, the pursuer was still able to improve its performance using behavior learning.
The reason for non-convergence is because of the invalid assumption made regarding
the linear attitude dynamics found in Eqn. 7.20. Despite the improperly modeled
relative system, the pursuer is still able to estimate values for k1 and k2 that are
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Figure VII.11. Behavior Learning Relative States
Figure VII.12. Behavior Learning Pursuer States
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Figure VII.13. Behavior Learning Evader States
Figure VII.14. Behavior Learning Control Input
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Figure VII.15. Behavior Learning Relative Cost
Figure VII.16. Effective Evader Gain Estimates
135
consistent with the measured values for the relative states and the assumed model.
This gives the pursuer some indication of how the evader is behaving and is used to
help the pursuer perform better than if a zero-sum strategy was implemented for the
entire game.
VII.E. Summary
Cumulative cost and cost-to-go comparisons for each of the three cases are shown
in Figs. VII.17 and VII.18. The pursuer is able to increase its performance for
the incomplete information scenario with the help of behavior learning. With the
effective estimates shown in Fig. VII.16, it can be concluded that behavior learning
algorithms will not always converge on the true solution but their results can still be
effective, much like the principles found in adaptive control [41]. The pursuer’s final
cost summary is shown in Table VII.1.
In the presence of severe modeling deficiencies, behavior learning aided the
pursuer in playing more effectively. The transient of the gain estimates shown in
Fig. VII.16 suggest that continuously augmenting the pursuer’s control solution could
be more effective than a single recomputation at the ten second mark. However, due
to the nature of infinite horizon games, the evader’s feedback gain Ke remains fixed.
If the pursuer were to continuously augment its solution, the evader would contin-
uously respond to the relative states which would actually decrease the pursuer’s
performance when compared to the incomplete information game with no behavior
learning enabled. Therefore, when subjected to an infinite horizon game, it is of the
best interest of the pursuer to converge on a behavior solution as quickly as possible
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Figure VII.17. Pursuer Cumulative Cost Comparison
Figure VII.18. Pursuer Cost-To-Go Comparison
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Table VII.1. Spacecraft Reorientation Cost Summary
Information Type Pursuer Cost
Complete 4.9093× 100
Incomplete 3.6394× 102
Incomplete + BL 7.2333× 101
then perform a control solution augmentation once.
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CHAPTER VIII
APPLICATIONS: MISSILE INTERCEPTION
The interception problem has been one of the most popular military applications
of differential games since the mid 1960’s [14]. Interception can be applied to a variety
of aircraft and missile scenarios including air-to-air combat of fighter jets, missile
guidance for aircraft interception, defensive maneuvering of an aircraft to prevent a
missile strike, and interception of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by a
missile defense system. Because of the expensive and high-risk testing that must be
done in the development of systems that can achieve such goals, applicable pursuit-
evasion solutions to the intercept problem are of high national interest.
With the help of differential game theory, several optimal missile guidance laws
have been developed which take advantage of a pursuit-evasion framework [42–45].
These guidance laws have been developed with both offensive and defensive strategies
in mind. Guidance laws that take into account the bounded control nature of missile
systems have also been studied [46], including applications of time-varying systems
[47]. For the interception of ICBMs upon reentry, linearized and multiple model
techniques have also been developed [48, 49]. More recently, cooperative solutions
have been of particular interest with focus on defensive strategies for missile and
aircraft teams [50–52].
Due to the important application of pursuit-evasion strategies to military de-
fense strategies, the need for these techniques to work under incomplete information
scenarios remains essential. The possible lack of intelligence associated with an oppo-
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nent continues to be an ongoing issue. Therefore, the application of behavior learning
techniques to the missile interception problem can be very helpful in reducing the
risk associated with development, testing, and final execution of the pursuit-evasion
based guidance laws.
Consider an ICBM at some altitude that has been detected by a missile defense
system. The flight of ICBMs can be separated into three phases: boost or ascent
phase, midcourse phase, and terminal phase. During the boost phase, the missile
aims to reach the exoatmosphere while achieving a specified flight envelope. During
midcourse, maneuvering via aerodynamic forces and moments is unavailable due to
air density. Following the midcourse phase, reentry occurs and the ICBM follows
a ballistic trajectory. A diagram illustrating these phases of flight are shown in
Fig. VIII.1.
Figure VIII.1. Flight Phases of an ICBM
Upon the detection of an enemy ICBM launch via reconnaissance satellites, a
second interceptor is launched to engage the threat and eliminate it. The goal of
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the interceptor is come within a specified range of the target such that the onboard
warhead’s effective kill radius can destroy the evading missile within a fixed amount of
time. Beyond that time, it could be possible for the evading missile system to deploy
other defensive measures, separate another stage creating confusion of the specified
target for the pursuer, or reach the exoatmosphere such that the aerodynamic forces
and moments used to control the interceptor are ineffective. This scenario has a direct
application to the ICBM interception problem which is an ongoing concern of military
defense agencies. Figure VIII.2 shows a desired trajectory for the interceptor.
Figure VIII.2. Desired Interception of an ICBM
The following chapter develops a pursuit-evasion missile interception scenario,
illustrates how an incomplete information game can affect the performance of the
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interceptor, and shows how behavior learning can be used to carry out a successful
mission in the presence of incomplete information.
VIII.A. Model
It will be assumed that the pursuing interceptor’s launch site lies directly below
the trajectory taken by the evading ICBM and neither the ICBM nor the interceptor
experience any lateral motion. By doing this, the missile interception problem can
be modeled in the vertical plane. The following additional assumptions are made
about both vehicles:
• Each vehicle is equipped with a variable thruster which must remain positive.
• Each vehicle is equipped with control surfaces producing a total aerodynamic
moment.
• Each vehicle maintains a constant mass throughout the game.
• The moment of inertia can be modeled by a constant density cylinder.
• Each vehicle experiences drag effects with a constant drag coefficient of 0.7.
• Drag is a function of speed and air density, which is a function of altitude.
• Drag acts through the center of pressure and opposite of the velocity vector.
• The earth is flat and acceleration due to gravity is constant.
The forces and moments which govern the motion of the missile in flight are
shown in Fig. VIII.3. The inertial reference frame is denoted by n1 and n2 while the
body-fixed reference frame is denoted by b1 and b2.
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Figure VIII.3. Missile Model
The equations of motion for a single vehicle with respect to the inertial reference
frame take on the form
mx¨ = −D cos (α + ψ) + T cos (ψ) , (8.1)
my¨ = −W −D sin (α + ψ) + T sin (ψ) , (8.2)
Iψ¨ = dcopD sin (α) +Maero , (8.3)
where x and y describe the inertial position of the vehicle and ψ describes the ori-
entation of the vehicle with respect to the horizon. Angle ψ represents the angle of
attack which is defined as the angle between the velocity vector and a body-fixed
axis running from the center of mass out through the missile nose cone. Forces W
and D are those from weight and drag, respectively, while dcop is the distance from
the center of mass to the center of pressure. The controls are given by the thrust
force, T , and the aerodynamic moments Maero. The vehicle’s mass properties are
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made up of mass m and moment of inertia I.
The objective of the pursuit-evasion game will rely on relative position, therefore
Eqns. 8.1 and 8.2 are of primary interest. Unfortunately, only one control, T , is
present in these equations. It is possible to take advantage of Eqn. 8.3 and use the
control Maero to track a reference value for ψ. By doing this, ψ can now be used as
an additional control within Eqns. 8.1 and 8.2 which provides two control inputs for
two degrees-of-freedom. Because the two-step dynamic inversion framework is affine
in the controls, it is necessary to define inputs v1 = T cos(ψ) and v2 = T sin(ψ).
For player i, equations 8.1 and 8.2 can be rewritten as
s˙i = fi +Givi , (8.4)
where
si = [xi, yi]
T , v = [vi1 , vi2 ]
T , (8.5)
and
fi =
 1mi (−Di cos (αi + ψi))
1
mi
−Wi −Di sin (αi + ψi)
 , Gi =
 1mi 0
0 1
mi
 . (8.6)
Equation 8.4 is in the form necessary for dynamic. At first glance, vector func-
tion fi seems to be linear in the states, which can be true depending on how one
wishes to consider the drag force Di. Drag is calculated using
Di =
1
2
ρiv
2
iCdiAci , (8.7)
where ρi is the air density which is computed as a function of altitude yi, and vi is
the airspeed which is a function of x˙i and y˙i. The drag coefficient and cross-sectional
area are denoted by Cdi and Aci , respectively. Therefore, it could be argued that Di
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is a nonlinear function of the states yi, x˙i, and y˙i, making fi a nonlinear function
of the states. If fi is considered to simply be a time-varying vector of parameters,
then it can also be modeled as a disturbance. For either case, implementing dynamic
inversion on the system will allow us to write the relative system in the familiar form
z˙ = Az +Bup −Bup.
By requesting that the acceleration level variables x¨i and y¨i be directly controlled
by ui1 and ui2 , respectively, it follows
vi = G
−1
i [wi − fi] , (8.8)
where
wi = [ui1 , ui2 ]
T . (8.9)
Vectorwi is provided from the pursuit-evasion optimal control solution, then Eqn. 8.8
is used to compute the necessary vi required to force the system to follow the dy-
namics imposed by wi. Finally, the necessary Ti and ψ∗i is computed using
ψ∗i = tan
−1
(
vi2
vi1
)
, (8.10)
Ti = vi1 cos (ψi) + vi2 sin (ψi) . (8.11)
By implementing a proportional-derivative (PD) or similar controller on ψ∗i using
Eqn. 8.3, a required value for Maeroi can be computed. This framework allows the
states of interest, xi and yi, to be controlled using the available controls Ti and Maeroi .
One item to address is whether ψi or ψ∗i should be used for the computation of Ti
in Eqn. 8.11. For consistency, the current value of ψi was used over the requested
ψ∗i based on the verified assumption that the controller on ψi can settle and track
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ψ∗i with the appropriate performance. The act of considering multiple degrees-of-
freedom and reducing them to the minimum number of states needed for the PE
game is referred to as transforming the realistic space to the reduced space [1].
For this system, dynamic inversion is used on a subset of the available states
based on the goals of the players. If this process is performed for each player, the
pursuit-evasion dynamics for Player i become
z˙i = Azi +Bui , (8.12)
where
zi = [xi, yi, x˙i, y˙i]
T , ui = [ui1 , ui2 ]
T , (8.13)
and
A =

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
−k 0 −c 0
0 −k 0 −c

, B =

0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1

, (8.14)
with k and c being positive constant. This particular selection of A allows the system
to experience damped oscillation if so desired. When k = c = 0, then Eqn. 8.12
reduces to the same single player model used in the previous chapters.
By defining the relative states as
z = zp − ze , (8.15)
the relative system equations of motion become
z˙ = Az +Bup +Bue . (8.16)
It is now possible to employ a linear-quadratic pursuit-evasion game for the two
missiles.
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VIII.B. Pursuit-Evasion Game
The final-time-fixed missile interception pursuit-evasion game is defined by the
zero-sum performance index
JMI =
1
2
zTf Sfzf +
1
2
∫ tf
t0
(
zTQz + uTpRpup − uTe Reue
)
dt , (8.17)
subject to the linear dynamic constraint defined by Eqn. 8.16. The optimal solutions
are given by
up = −R−1p BTSz , (8.18)
ue = −R−1e BTSz , (8.19)
where S is the solution to the differential Riccati equation
S˙ = −Q− ATS − SA− SB (R−1e −R−1p )BTS . (8.20)
VIII.C. Behavior Learning
Behavior learning, which is enabled by the pursuer, will attempt to estimate a
model for the evader’s strategy and therefore a means to predict the evader’s behavior
for all time. This behavior is captured in the opponent’s Kalman gain Ke which takes
on the form shown in Eqn. 8.21.
Ke = R
−1
e B
TS . (8.21)
Because of the final-time-fixed nature of the game, Ke is time-varying. With A and
B known, all reasonable assumptions about the system should be applied in an effort
to reduce the number of states that need to be estimated to find a solution for the
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opponent’s behavior. The following assumptions are made by the pursuer’s behavior
learning algorithm:
• The evader implements a zero-sum safe strategy.
• The evader is not capable of behavior learning.
• The evader is not concerned with the relative states during game play.
• The evader weighs each of the relative position states at tf equally.
• The evader is not concerned with the relative velocity states at tf .
• The evader weighs each of the control inputs equally.
• The evader does not weigh any cross-coupling terms.
Under these assumptions, the evader’s Kalman gain gain takes on the form
Ke =
 s3r 0 s2r 0
0 s3
r
0 s2
r
 , (8.22)
where
Sf =

sf 0 0 0
0 sf 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, S =

s1 0 s3 0
0 s1 0 s3
s3 0 s2 0
0 s3 0 s2

, Rp =
1 0
0 1
 , Re =
r 0
0 r
 .
(8.23)
and Q = 0. Variables s2 and s3 found within Ke are time-varying and subject to
S˙ = −ATS − SA− SB (R−1e −R−1p )BTS . (8.24)
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The behavior learning algorithm becomes an estimator for the relative state
vector z, the three independent elements of S, and r. These states are summarized
by the estimate vector
x =

z1
z2
z3
z4
s1
s2
s3
r

=

x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8

. (8.25)
The state equations for x1 − x4 are given by
z˙ = (A+BKe) z +Bup , (8.26)
while those for x5− x7 are given by the scalar counterparts found in Eqn. 8.24. The
state equation for x8 is zero.
The state equations needed for the nonlinear estimator are summarized by
x˙(t) = f (x(t),u(t), t) , (8.27)
149
where
f =

x3
x4
up1 − x3
(
c− x6
x8
)
− x1
(
k − x7
x8
)
up2 − x4
(
c− x6
x8
)
− x2
(
k − x7
x8
)
2kx7 − x27
(
1
x8
− 1
)
x26
(
1− 1
x8
)
+ 2cx6 − 2x7
cx7 − x5 + kx6 − x6x7
(
1
x8
− 1
)
0

, (8.28)
and up = [up1 , up2 ]
T . The measurements available are the relative states defined by
y˜k = h (xk) = [x1 , x2 , x3 , x4]
T . (8.29)
Equations 8.27 and 8.29 are in the standard form needed for a nonlinear filter.
Any of several nonlinear estimation techniques can be used to filter the relative states
and estimate the strategy parameters s1, s2, s3 and r. By estimating these strategy
parameters, the pursuer can then propagate these states forward in time to arrive
at the estimated Sf . Because propagating the Riccati equation forward in time can
lead to instability, caution must be exercised. The results shown were obtained by
propagating the Riccati equation forward in time, then using the computed Sf to
propagate backwards in time again in order to arrive at the best S for all time to
define the behavior of the evader. If desired, these estimates can be continuously
monitored and the pursuer may recompute its solution as necessary. The one-sided
optimal control solution when Ke is known for all time is given in Section II.D.
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Additional constraints also exist on the matrices S and Re. From the opti-
mal control theory these solution were derived from, S must be symmetric positive
semidefinite for all time and Re must be positive definite for all time. These con-
straints can be imposed by computing the nearest symmetric positive definite matrix
VIII.D. Simulation
To develop a baseline case for comparison purposes, a complete information case
is simulated along with incomplete information and behavior learning enabled cases.
The complete information gain selections are summarized by
Sf =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, Rp =
1 0
0 1
 , Re =
5 0
0 5
 . (8.30)
For the complete information case, each player assumes a zero-sum strategy using
the gains defined in Eqn. 8.30.
The initial conditions for all cases were chosen to be
zi0 =

xi0 [m]
yi0 [m]
ψi0 [rad]
x˙i0
[
m
s
]
y˙i0
[
m
s
]
ψ˙i0
[
rad
s
]

, zp0 =

1000
0
pi
2
100 cos
(
pi
2
)
100 sin
(
pi
2
)
0

, ze0 =

0
3000
pi
12
150 cos
(
pi
12
)
150 cos
(
pi
12
)
0

. (8.31)
The additional properties used to define the missile vehicles and environment are
given in Table VIII.1.
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Table VIII.1. Missile Mass Properties
Property Value Units
Mass 100 kg
Length 0.5 m
Radius 0.05 m
Drag Coefficient 0.7 N/A
Acceleration due to Gravity 9.81 m/s2
Imperfect information dictates that the relative state measurements are subject
to a zero-mean Gaussian noise distribution. A standard deviation of σ = 0.03 was
used for the relative position measurements and σ = 0.1 was used for the relative
velocity measurements. In practice, the relative position could be measured directly
from relative sensors onboard the missile such at heat signature, radar, or laser based
sensors. Based on the difference of these measurements between time steps and with
the help of an inertial measurement unit, the relative velocities could be computed. It
is also possible for a player to use a GPS-aided inertial navigation system to measure
its own inertial states and have the inertial states of the opponent provided via
communication link with a satellite- or ground-based tracking system. The relative
measurements could then be formed from both sets of inertial states.
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VIII.D.1. Complete Information
The complete information scenario was simulated in an effort to gain an un-
derstanding of the baseline performance. For each case, a final-time of 30 seconds
was used along with a time step of 0.1 seconds. Results for this case are shown in
Figs. VIII.4 - VIII.6. Figure VIII.4 gives a view of the vertical plane the game takes
place in. The relative states for the 30 second game are summarized in Fig. VIII.5.
Cumulative cost and cost-to-go plots are shown in Fig. VIII.6. The final cost for
both players was calculated to be 1.3686× 103.
Figure VIII.4. Complete Information Vertical Plane View
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Figure VIII.5. Complete Information Relative States
Figure VIII.6. Complete Information Cost Analysis
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VIII.D.2. Incomplete Information
For, the incomplete information case, the pursuer assumed the same gains from
the complete information case while the evader decided on a different gain selection.
These gains are summarized by
Sfe =

1.5 0 0 0
0 1.5 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

, Rpe =
1 0
0 1
 , Ree =
4 0
0 4
 . (8.32)
The results for the incomplete information scenario are shown in Figs. VIII.7 - VIII.9.
Figure VIII.7 gives a view of the vertical plane the game takes place in. The relative
states for the 30 second game are summarized in Fig. VIII.8. Cumulative cost and
cost-to-go plots are shown in Fig. VIII.9. As expected, the total cost for both the
pursuer and evader increased with the gain assumptions associated with the incom-
plete information scenario. The pursuer’s total cost was computed at 1.8537 × 103
while that of the evader was 1.7561× 103.
VIII.D.3. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning
The incomplete information scenario was simulated again with the pursuer en-
abled with a behavior learning algorithm. Behavior learning was used to compute
and implement a one-sided optimal control solution at t = 3 seconds. Results for
this case are illustrated in Figs. VIII.10 - VIII.18.
Figure VIII.10 gives a view of the vertical plane the game takes place in.
Behavior learning estimates for the first five seconds of the game are are shown
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Figure VIII.7. Incomplete Information Vertical Plane View
Figure VIII.8. Incomplete Information Relative States
156
Figure VIII.9. Incomplete Information Cost Analysis
in Figs. VIII.11 and VIII.12. The relative states are summarized in Fig. VIII.13
while the inertial states for the pursuer and the evader can be seen Figs. VIII.14
and VIII.15, respectively.
Approximately one second passes before the S estimates can properly converge
on the true values. In addition to the transients associated with the EKF, this
is also brought about by the response in orientation tracking by the two vehicles.
The response time for the commanded ψ for each vehicle is shown in Figs. VIII.14
and VIII.15. A PD controller was implemented to exploit ψ as a control input for the
PE game. Large gain selections of Kψp = 25 and Kψe = 10 were chosen to achieve the
quick but damped response. These PD gain selections were used for both vehicles. A
satisfactory response in ψ is essential for the behavior learning algorithm to properly
estimate the strategy gains.
The implementation of the new control solution is evident at the 3 second mark
in Fig. VIII.14 when the pursuer’s requested ψ makes a drastic switch once the
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Figure VIII.10. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning Vertical
Plane View
Figure VIII.11. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning S Esti-
mates
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Figure VIII.12. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning R Esti-
mate
Figure VIII.13. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning Relative
States
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opponent’s behavior can be predicted.
Figure VIII.14. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning Pursuer
States
The actual and requested input by the dynamic inversion process is shown in
Fig. VIII.16. This discrepancy is also a product of the response time in the ψ-
tracking. Larger errors in the requested and actual input are shown at the beginning
of the game when each vehicle becomes aware of their opponent. The true missile
control inputs are illustrated in Fig. VIII.17. The thrust input for the pursuer peaks
at approximately 2.4 kN and trails off to approximately 800 N. This is representative
of an engine equipped with a maximum thrust of 2.5 kN which can be throttled down
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Figure VIII.15. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning Evader
States
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to approximately 30%. The evader’s thrust characteristics would require an engine
size with a maximum thrust value of 1.2 kN with throttling capabilities down to 75%.
Recently, Space Exploration Technologies Corporation has included the capability
of throttling down to 70% in their Merlin 1D rocket engines [53]. Although anti-
missile systems are generally equipped with solid rocket boosters unlike the Merlin
1D engines, newer examples of interceptor missile have adopted liquid rocket designs
specifically for their throttling capabilities.
Figure VIII.16. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning Dynamic
Inversion Input
Cumulative cost and cost-to-go plots are shown in Fig. VIII.18. The total cost
for the pursuer was decreased as a result of the behavior learning algorithm, but it
was still higher than that associated with the complete information scenario. The
pursuer’s total cost was computed at 1.3745 × 103 while that of the evader was
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Figure VIII.17. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning Missile
Input
1.4984× 103.
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Figure VIII.18. Incomplete Information with Behavior Learning Cost
Analysis
VIII.E. Summary
A comparison of the pursuer’s cumulative cost for each of the three simulation
found in this chapter are shown in Fig. VIII.19. With the introduction of behavior
learning, the pursuer is able to predict how the evader will respond and modify the
two-sided pursuit-evasion problem into a one-sided optimal control problem. The
advantage of this method when in the presence of incomplete information is sum-
marized by the cumulative cost comparison. With behavior learning, the pursuer’s
final cost approaches that of the complete information case. Is it clear that behavior
learning can be extremely useful when applied to final-time-fixed interception prob-
lems and robust enough to provide a solution when dynamic inversion and alternate
control methods are necessary for implementation. The pursuer’s final cost summary
is shown in Table VIII.2. The primary limitation of final-time-fixed behavior learn-
ing is due to the unstable nature of the Riccati equation when propagated forward
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Figure VIII.19. Pursuer Cumulative Cost Comparison
in time. Therefore, it is essential for the behavior learning algorithm to converge
on proper strategy estimates before using those estimates to propagate forward in
time to compute Sf . A few additional steps are necessary to make this algorithm
robust enough for repeatable execution. The estimates related to the Q and R gain
matrices that are used for the new solution computation should be selected based
on their covariance. That is, throughout the first few seconds of the game, those
values with the smallest associated covariance value should be selected. The selected
estimates of S are also of critical importance. After the covariance converges, a set
of estimates for each parameter should be taken into consideration over the period of
one to three seconds. Because the Riccati equation experiences near-linear behavior
at the beginning of the game, the effective estimate for each of these parameters can
be taken as the mean of the values from the desired period. These mean values are
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Table VIII.2. Missile Interception Cost Summary
Information Type Pursuer Cost
Complete 1.3686× 103
Incomplete 1.8537× 103
Incomplete + BL 1.3745× 103
then used to determine an effective S at a time at the midpoint of the sample period.
This process was implemented to achieve robustness and repeatability.
One possible solution to the Riccati forward propagation issue is the implemen-
tation of the inverse Riccati equation. Its use, however, does not necessarily eliminate
all forward propagation issues. The inverse Riccati equation is useful for certain gain
selections, but in many cases, can produce a solutions for the independent elements
of S which exhibit additional dynamic characteristics which are undesirable. Its use
should also be exercised with caution. With that, it would be more convenient if
a single forward propagator could be used reliably and handle all types of gain se-
lections because the initialization of an opponent’s strategy is simply a guess. An
opponent’s strategy could be defined by any number of gain combinations and for
this reason, the implemented forward Riccati propagation with additional statistical
analysis proved to be the most effective. The inverse Riccati equation could be used
in addition to the method presented here and the best solution could be implemented
for the control solution augmentation.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
This dissertation presented behavior learning frameworks for final-time-fixed,
infinite-horizon, and final-time-free pursuit-evasion games which are applicable to the
incomplete, imperfect, and uncertain information scenarios. The developed methods
focus on continuous-time pursuit-evasion games whose cost functions are quadratic
in nature and whose relative dynamic systems are defined by linear differential equa-
tions. A two-step dynamic inversion technique was introduced to allow these behavior
learning methods to be extended to nonlinear, control-affine dynamic systems. The
two-step process outlined allows systems that are nonlinear in the kinematics and
dynamics to take on the form of a linear double-integrator.
Two key aerospace applications were shown which invoked the behavior learn-
ing and dynamic inversion methods presented. Spacecraft rendezvous and missile
interception are problems of current national interest that could benefit greatly from
the implementation of behavior learning techniques in parallel with optimal pursuit-
evasion solutions. It was shown that although a behavior learning algorithm may
not always converge on the exact behavior of an evader, it remains an effective way
to give a player a tactical advantage over simply implementing a zero-sum strat-
egy. Behavior learning provides a model to an opponent’s strategy that can be used
to predict their behavior and allow a player to turn a pursuit-evasion game into a
one-sided optimal control problem.
An example pertaining to the minimum-time case was also studied. Although
167
the minimum-time formulation can become increasingly complex when multiple degrees-
of-freedom are considered, the simple scalar example has merit due to the obvious
application of minimum-time solutions and behavior learning to the missile intercep-
tion and associated warfare problems.
IX.A. Chapter Summary
A motivational example was presented in Ch. I which illustrated how a player’s
performance diminishes as key information about the game and system is revoked.
Chapter II identified the behavior learning aspects of incomplete information final-
fixed-time games and extended those concepts to the uncertain information case. The
role of behavior learning in infinite-horizon PE games was examined in Ch. III and
techniques for the incomplete and uncertain information scenarios were presented.
Insight to behavior learning for final-time-free games was given in Ch. IV and
the role of behavior learning was identified for minimum-time games. Chapter V
presented a minimum-time behavior learning example and the utility for behavior
learning for the minimum-time case. A two-step dynamic inversion method was
presented in Ch. VI to allow for the use of these behavior learning methods for
nonlinear, control-affine dynamic systems.
Chapter VII presented a spacecraft reorientation example which took on the
form of an infinite-horizon pursuit-evasion game. Dynamic inversion was used to
allow the nonlinear system to fit within the behavior learning framework that was
developed. In the presence of significant modeling deficiencies, it was shown that
although the behavior learning algorithms may not converge on the true solution
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defining an opponent’s strategy, it remains effective at modeling behavior and giv-
ing a player a tactical advantage. It was learned that behavior learning for the
infinite-horizon case provides the best performance when used to implement a con-
trol augmentation at a single, early time during the PE game.
A missile interception example was provided in Ch. VIII which utilized a final-
time-fixed pursuit-evasion game. Dynamic inversion was implemented to a system
that could be deemed to be nonlinear or linear with a disturbance. The orientation
state, ψ, was used as a control variable to allow for the system to fit within the
control-affine framework of dynamic inversion as the relative states were transformed
from the realistic space to a reduced space. Behavior learning was applied to the
incomplete information case and was effective at reducing the total cost for the
pursuer. Details for robust and repeatable implementation were outlined to account
for the unstable nature of the Riccati equation when propagated forward in time.
IX.B. Limitations
A few limitations became apparent during the development of the behavior
learning framework. One potential issue with any any filter-type implementation
is observability. Observability should always be treated on a case-by-case basis. If
observability becomes a concern, a simplified model can be used to obtain a repre-
sentative model of the opponent’s behavior. To do this, assumptions must be made
about the opponent’s behavior and all relevant knowledge about the system must
be applied including gain matrix properties such as positive definiteness and diag-
onalness. Additionally, multiple model approaches can be used in conjunction with
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different combinations of assumptions to produce multiple behavior learning solu-
tions. A blended solution or the solution with the best statistical properties can
then be used to augment a player’s strategy.
It is important to exercise caution when applying two-step dynamic inversion.
Based on the feasibility of the selection of desired dynamics, large control magnitudes
can be experienced. It is also possible for system oscillations to occur if the natural
response of the nonlinear and desired linear systems significantly disagree. Therefore,
it is important that the desired linear dynamics are carefully selected based on the
nonlinear system of interest. Oscillation and damping terms can be added to the
desired system in effort to achieve an acceptable response.
As previously mentioned, infinite-horizon behavior learning can be exceptionally
difficult to implement because the feedback gain K is fix for a player until they decide
to augment their solution. Because of this fixed gain, if behavior learning is used
multiple times throughout the game, the pursuer runs the risk of continuously driving
the opponent further and further away while exhausting control input. The nature
of infinite-horizon pursuit-evasion games dictates that behavior learning is best done
at a single instance in time, as soon as a solution for the opponent’s behavior is
obtained. By doing so, the pursuer is able to quickly augment their strategy without
sacrificing an excessive amount of control and driving the evader farther away at the
same time. Infinite-horizon pursuit-evasion is not a type of differential game that
is often examined giving these observations merit as the study of behavior learning
evolves.
Finally, the forward propagation of the Riccati equation can cause instabilities.
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In the final-time-fixed case where the forward propagation of the Riccati equation is
necessary, it is essential to select valid gains for solution recomputation. Additional
data processing proved useful in order to arrive at an acceptable solution that could
be propagated forward in time without difficulty. One possible solution to the Riccati
forward propagation issue is the implementation of the inverse Riccati equation.
The inverse Riccati equation may prove to be useful in some instances where
instabilities are observed. Its use, however, does not necessarily eliminate all forward
propagation issues. The inverse Riccati equation is useful for certain gain selections,
but in many cases, can produce solutions for the independent elements of S which
exhibit additional dynamic characteristics which are undesirable. Its use should also
be exercised with caution. With that, it would be more convenient if a single forward
propagator could be used reliably and handle all types of gain selections because the
initial value of an opponent’s strategy is simply a guess. An opponent’s strategy could
be defined by any number of gain combinations and for this reason, the implemented
forward Riccati propagation with additional statistical analysis proved to be the
most effective. The inverse Riccati equation could be used in addition to the method
presented here and the best solution could be implemented for the control solution
augmentation.
IX.C. Extensions
The behavior learning framework presented focused on the perspective of the
pursuer. In each example, the pursuer was enabled with behavior learning such that
it was able to gain a tactical advantage over the evader. Even though the evader con-
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tinued to invoke a zero-sum safe strategy, there is nothing preventing the evader from
also implementing its own behavior learning algorithm. Furthermore, both players
can be enabled with behavior learning in an effort to study the effects of continuously
evolving opponent models. The assumptions made about an opponent may need to
be modified to account for an intelligent challenger with the same behavior learning
abilities. Depending on the accuracy of the model and the frequency of opponent
strategy augmentation, player performance could increase or decrease drastically.
Behavior learning can be implemented for offensive or defensive purposes.
Multiple model solutions would allow opponent behavior to be modeled by a
bank of possible objective functions. This could include external objectives - such as
hitting a specified target - and could aid in determining an asset that an opponent
is attempting to conquer. Different assumptions defining the strategy gains could
be used to help determine what the opponent is most interested in. The behavior
learning solution may be defined by a blended solution or it may become a function
of the solution with the most appealing statistical characteristics such as the model
with the lowest associated covariance values.
Behavior learning is highly applicable to pursuit-evasion teams or teams of ve-
hicles. Specifically, teams of unmanned aerial vehicles who may be working coopera-
tively but who want to maintain minimum distances throughout a trajectory. If each
teammate’s behavior can be properly modeled then a more comprehensive forward
propagation can be used to predict vehicle interaction throughout a flight path. This
has direct applications to path planning for commercial aviation and has the poten-
tial to have significant impact once fully autonomous flight systems are adopted.
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With pilot-in-the-loop applications, greater safety measures can be defined around
high traffic areas such as airports during the take-off and landing processes.
Minimum-time applications are a rich topic and an extension of the major prin-
ciples from the final-time-fixed and infinite-horizon scenarios can be applied further.
This can become a complicated issue due to the presence of constraints and the
desire for feedback solutions. Minimum-time is most applicable to military applica-
tions where a threat must be recognized and intercepted immediately so secondary
defenses can be utilized if the initial line of defenses are unsuccessful at exterminating
the threat.
Behavior learning has proven to be a powerful tool for pursuit-evasion games.
It can be used to enhance the performance of a player in the presence of incomplete,
imperfect, and uncertain information. Although some characteristics of the frame-
work need to be exercised with care, the methods presented have a broad impact on
aerospace applications of high national interest including spacecraft rendezvous and
missile defense.
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